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85-1537

Supreme Court, U.S.
F I L E D
MAR 5 1986
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK

No. ____

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1985

BETTY O. MUKA, Appellant

v.

FRANK A. CARTER, JR.
CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL

APPEAL FROM THE RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

(APPENDIX ALSO)

Betty O. Muka
Appellant
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Ithaca, N. Y. 14850
(607) 257-2016

15.1(e) QUESTIONS PRESENTED (pp. 1-45)

1. Under the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island (Art. X, Amend. XII) is the jurisdiction of the Rhode Island Supreme Court limited to final revisory and appellate jurisdiction upon all questions of law and equity, and such other jurisdiction as is prescribed by law? (answer sought: yes)

2. Under the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island is the Rhode Island Supreme Court specifically granted original jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings against lawyers? (answer sought: no)

3. Has the Rhode Island Legislature enacted any statute which is still in effect which grants original jurisdiction to the Rhode Island Supreme Court over disciplinary proceedings against lawyers? (answer sought: no)

4. When the Rhode Island Supreme Court

presided over the original disciplinary hearings against Rhode Island attorney Betty O. Muka did it lack original jurisdiction to do so under the Rhode Island Constitution and laws? (answer sought: yes)

5. Are all of the actions of the Rhode Island Supreme Court taken with respect to the disciplinary proceedings against Betty O. Muka void ab initio for lack of original subject matter jurisdiction? (answer sought: yes)

6. Under the Constitution and laws of the State of Rhode Island is any Rhode Island court granted original jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings against lawyers? (answer sought: no)

7. Under the Constitution of the State (e.g. Art. X, Amend. XII) of Rhode Island/does the Rhode Island Supreme Court have the power to grant to it-

self original jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, or over any other subject matter? (answer sought: no)

8. Under the Rhode Island Constitution (Amend. XII) is Rhode Island Supreme Court Rule 42-1 "disciplinary jurisdiction" of the Rhode Island Supreme Court limited to appellate jurisdiction? (answer sought: yes)

9. On its face does Rhode Island Supreme Court Rule 42-6(d) show that the "disciplinary jurisdiction" of the Rhode Island Supreme Court is only appellate in nature and not original in nature? (answer sought: yes)

10. When the Rhode Island Supreme Court presided over the original disciplinary hearings against Rhode Island attorney Betty O. Muka did it act unconstitutionally under Amend. XII of the Rhode Island Constitution?

(answer sought: yes)

11. By mentioning "disciplinary jurisdiction" of the Rhode Island Supreme Court, but not clearly stating that it was only appellate jurisdiction and not original jurisdiction, is Rhode Island Supreme Court Rule 42-1 unconstitutional under the Rhode Island Constitution (e.g. Amend. XII) to the extent that it infers that original jurisdiction also exists in the Rhode Island Supreme Court, and is Rule 42-1 unconstitutional under the United States Constitution, 14th Amendment, and void for vagueness because its language is subject to arbitrary and different interpretations and abuse? (answer sought: yes, yes)

12. Can a court constitutionally and/or legally exercise judicial powers over a proceeding in which it lacks constitutional and statutory subject matter jurisdiction? (answer sought: no)

13. When a court acts without subject matter jurisdiction, are all of its acts void ab initio? (answer sought: yes)

14. Is Supreme Court Rule 42 and all of its sub-parts 42-1 through 42-22 unconstitutional and illegal under the Rhode Island Constitution (e.g. Art. X, Amend. XII) and laws by reason there is no Rhode Island court with original subject matter jurisdiction in which disciplinary proceedings against lawyers can be commenced? (answer sought: yes)

15. Under Rhode Island Constitution, Article III requiring distribution of powers, is Rhode Island Supreme Court Rule 42 and all of its sub-parts unconstitutional by reason that through such the Rhode Island Supreme Court purports to grant to itself all executive (42-4, 42-5, 42-6), legislative (42-4(c)(4)) and judicial (42-1, 42-6(d)) powers simultaneously in regard to disciplinary proceedings against law-

yers? (answer sought: yes)

16. Under the constitutional due process guarantees of the United States Constitution, 14th Amendment, is Rhode Island Supreme Court Rule 42 and all of its subparts unconstitutional for purporting to concentrate all executive, legislative and judicial power in the Rhode Island Supreme Court with regard to disciplinary proceedings against lawyers? (answer sought: yes)

17. Since the Rhode Island Supreme Court appoints the Disciplinary Counsel (42-5(a)) and the members of the Disciplinary Board and designates their Chairman and Vice-Chairman (42-4(a)), can direct the Disciplinary Board to consider and cause to be investigated the conduct of any attorney, which is the Disciplinary Board's duty to do when directed (42-4(c)(1)), can bring to the attention of the Disci-

plinary Counsel matters involving alleged misconduct of an attorney, which it is Disciplinary Counsel's duty to investigate (42-5(b)(1)), and the members of the Disciplinary Board and Disciplinary Counsel and his staff are all immune from suit for any misconduct in the course of their official duties (42-7), and the pleadings and proceedings are all "confidential" and secret (42-21), but any Rhode Island Supreme Court order imposing some disciplinary sanction is not confidential (42-21), the entire procedural set-up makes possible the arbitrary abuse of it by the Rhode Island Supreme Court and the Disciplinary Board and Disciplinary Counsel and his staff, all under the Rhode Island Supreme Court's direct control, and fails to provide any impartial or independent determiner of probable cause or factfinder, and thus the Rhode Island Supreme Court Rule 42 and all of

its subparts are unconstitutional by reason they violate the Constitutional due process standards guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, which amendment also prohibits the states from depriving any person of any property (right) without such Constitutional due process of law. Is that statement true? (answer sought: yes)

18. Does Rhode Island Supreme Court Rule 42 and all of its sub-parts additionally violate the Constitutional due process guarantees of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution by reason it deprives the respondent attorney of the unilateral right to subpoenas to compel witnesses in his behalf by imposing an unnecessary procedure capable of arbitrary abuse and delay (42-11), it deprives the respondent attorney of unilateral rights to engage in pre-hearing discovery

(42-11), it deprives the respondent of a public trial (42-21), it deprives the respondent of a trial by jury (42-6(a), (b) and (d)), and review that it mentions does not provide for the respondent to be heard at it (42-6(d)? (answer sought: yes)

19. Does the Rhode Island Supreme Court Rule 42 and all of its sub-parts violate the United States Constitution, Amendment 14, in regard to guarantees of the equal protection of the law and prohibitions against states from denying any person within its jurisdiction of the equal protection of the laws, by reason it subjects the clearly defined discrete and suspect class of attorneys licensed to practice law in Rhode Island to discrimination without any reasonable relation to any substantial state interest in doing so, in that the attorneys are deprived (42-11) of unilateral discovery rights which all other liti-

gants in the State of Rhode Island have without leave of court (e.g. Rhode Island Rules of Civil Practice (RCP) Rules 26-37& 45), and the attorneys are deprived (42-11) of unilateral rights to subpoenas for compelling witnesses in their behalf which all other litigants in Rhode Island have (e.g. RCP 45(a)-(f)), and the attorneys are deprived (42-6(a), (b) and (f)) of a trial by jury guaranteed to every other litigant in the State of Rhode Island (Rhode Island Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 15, and RCP 38, 39, etc.), and the attorneys are deprived (42-6) of the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury, and to not be deprived of his liberty and property (rights) unless by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land, which all other persons charged with wrongful acts in the State of Rhode Island are constitutionally guaranteed (e.g. Rhode Island Constitution, Article I, Sec-

tion 10 in criminal proceedings and Section 15 in civil proceedings) and are guaranteed by court rule (e.g. Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 23(a), for criminal prosecutions, and Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 38 and 39 for civil proceedings), and such Rhode Island Supreme Court Rule 42 and all of its subparts cannot pass the "rational relation" or "strict scrutiny" tests for constitutionality? (answer sought: yes)

20. Is the Rhode Island Supreme Court Rule 42 and all its subparts unconstitutional under the Rhode Island Constitution, Article I, Section 2 because it has not been made for the good of the whole people, as it deprives the people of the services of licensed attorneys by way of a totally arbitrary and unconstitutional process, either directly or indirectly by way of the "chilling effect" upon the way

licensed attorneys provide their professional services to the people and/or practice law under fear of such disciplinary action? (answer sought: yes)

21. Is the Rhode Island Supreme Court Rule 42 and all its subparts unconstitutional under the Rhode Island Constitution, Article I, Section 5 by reason that the disciplinary procedures do not require that any procedures or actions taken conform to the laws of Rhode Island, and also by reason that the disciplinary procedures do not provide the respondent attorney with any recourse to the laws of the State of Rhode Island, and also by reason that the disciplinary procedures do not provide procedures for obtaining right and justice, freely and without purchase, completely and without denial; promptly and without dely, conformably to the laws? (answer sought: yes)

22. Is Rhode Island Supreme Court Rule 42 and all its subparts unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution, Amendment 14 guarantees of due process of law and equal protection of the law, and Rhode Island Constitution, Article I, Section 5 rights to justice, by reason Rule 42 does not require the existance of any complainant or person wronged, does not require any person with legal standing or a direct interest in the outcome to initiate the proceedings, does not require that any evidence of any fact upon which to base the proceedings exist, does not require any determination of probable cause to be made before or during the proceedings, does not require that any person with personal knowledge of the facts give any evidence of such, does not require that any rules of evidence be applied, does not require that any evidence be admitted, does not set forth any guide-

lines for the admission or exclusion of evidence or require that evidence be relevant, material or necessary, does not specify that any person has any burden of production of evidence or any burden of persuasion or specify any degree of any such burden for any party, does not state that the respondent attorney is presumed to be innocent of wrongdoing until any wrongdoing whatsoever is evidenced or proved (also contrary to Rhode Island Constitution, Article I. Section 14, and U. S. Constitution, Amendments 5 and 6 by interpretation and through Amendment 14), does not protect respondent's right to not testify against himself (also contrary to Rhode Island Constitution, Article I, Section 13, and U.S. Constitution, 5th Amendment), does not require any decision to be supported by any fact or any law, much less by any substantial kind or amount of evidence, either originally or upon

any review by any Rhode Island Court, does not require that the petition against the respondent attorney be verified by a person with knowledge of the facts stated therein or supported by any affidavit of a person with knowledge of the facts stated in the petition, does not require that the allegations in the petition state facts constituting professional misconduct, does not require that the allegations in the petition be proved to be true or even evidenced, does not require that the decision be based upon either the allegations of the petition or any evidence whatsoever, does not authorize counterpetitions or counterclaims, does not authorize defenses in law or fact, does not require responses to counterpetitions or counterclaims, does not authorize motion practice or provide for any hearings or decisions related to objections in law before, during or after

the hearings or at any time before disposition or afterward, and is 100% arbitrary, capricious, unconstitutional, illegal and abusive in design? (answer sought: yes)

23. Is Rhode Island Supreme Court Rule 42 and all of its subparts unconstitutional under the United States Constitution, Amendment 14 guarantees to due process of law and equal protection of the law, and Rhode Island Constitution, Article I, Section 5, by reason that there is no clerk that holds any file or record of the disciplinary proceedings against any lawyer, and the respondent lawyer cannot see any file of his case, and the prosecutor (Disciplinary Counsel) and the Supreme Court judges engage in ex parte contacts related to both the procedure and the merits, which contacts are sometimes recorded and sometimes not recorded, and put into the prosecutor's file only, and are never available to the

respondent attorney to see or copy or even know about in any way, and many such proceedings take place without notice or any opportunity to defend or object thereto and without the prosecutor or the court having to support the actions sought and taken with any allegation of fact or law in support thereof, and without the decision being required to be based upon any fact or any law or any rule, and without any procedure by which the respondent attorney can find out what happened or why or who did what or to review the actions taken or to be heard in any way or given any consideration whatsoever in regard to them? (answer sought: yes)

24. When a person becomes licensed to practice law, does that person lose the state and federal constitutonal, statutory, common law and/or civil rights that such person had while unlicensed? (an-

swer sought: no)

25. Is a state, including the State of Rhode Island, prohibited by the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution from requiring a person to give up or to waive any of his constitutional, statutory, common law and/or civil rights as a condition to being licensed to practice law in that state? (answer sought: yes)

26. Under the Supremacy Clause (Article VI, Sec. 2) of the United States Constitution, which makes the United States Constitution and laws (and treaties) the "supreme law of the land", and under the privileges and immunities clause and the due process clause and the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and under federal statutes (e.g. Title 42 U.S.C. 1981 guarantees of equal rights to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full

and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property, and to be subject to the same punishment, penalties, licenses and exactions of every kind, and to no other, as all other persons within the jurisdiction of the United States, do such federal constitutional and statutory provisions preempt any and all state constitutions, state statutes, state rules, state procedures, and state case law and/or common law which are inconsistent with such federal guarantees? (answer sought: yes)

27. Under Article VI, Sec. 3, of the United States Constitution, are all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States (including members of the United States Supreme Court) and of the State of Rhode Island (including members of the Rhode Island Supreme Court) bound by oath or affirmation to support the United States Constitution, including

the aforementioned guarantees and provisions, by declaring Rhode Island Supreme Court Rule 42 and all of its sub-parts to be unconstitutional for inconsistency with the United States Constitution, and by nullifying and voiding ab initio and reversing all proceedings and actions taken by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in regard to the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent attorney therein, Betty O. Muka, and declaring that as a matter of fact the present status is that Rhode Island Constitution and laws fail to give original jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings against lawyers to any Rhode Island court. (answer sought: yes)

28. Disciplinary Rule 8-102(A) and (B) of the Rhode Island Code of Professional Responsibility is unconstitutional under the First Amendment to the United States

Constitution by reason it constitutes a prior restraint upon the freedom of speech and has a "chilling effect" upon the exercise of that right by attorneys, and furthermore because Rhode Island Supreme Court Rule 42 and all of its subsections under which the State of Rhode Island purports to enforce the Code of Professional Responsibility denies the clearly defined and suspect minority class of Rhode Island licensed attorneys of all of the federal and Rhode Island state constitutional and statutory and common law and civil rights guarantees to due process of law and equal protection of the law (see preceeding questions) which all other citizens who are not licensed attorneys have (and licensed attorneys also have) in ordinary civil actions in the Rhode Island state courts and in the Rhode Island federal courts wherein there must be an actual complainant who has suffered actual damages and

who has standing to sue the attorney for libel, slander, defamation, etc., and who must actually state a claim cognizable at law upon which relief can be granted, and who must also prove such claim with admissible evidence, at a trial where the laws of evidence are controlling and the burden of production of evidence and the burden of persuasion are that of the plaintiff and not that of the defendant, and where the evidence must be sufficient at law to prove a prima facie case, and where there is a constitutional right to a jury trial and to an impartial factfinder, and where an impartial factfinder weighs the evidence and determines if a specific standard of proof has been met both for the claims and also for any defenses which the defendant has a right to raise and prove and have considered and which right is equal to that of the plaintiff's right, and where the verdict, decision and/or judgment must

be supported by substantial admissible evidence and in conformance with the relevant and controlling law, and where the plaintiffs and defendants have an equal and unilateral and unimpaired right to full discovery before trial and to subpoenas to compell witnesses in their behalf, and where there is an equal statutory right to appellate review on issues of errors of fact, errors of law, and constitutional questions, and where the parties have a right to make opening and closing statements and to have the factfinder instructed properly in the relevant and controlling law and directed to faithfully follow such law - none of which elements are any part of the disciplinary proceedings against attorneys in the State of Rhode Island under its Supreme Court Rule 42, et seq. Is that statement true? (answer sought: yes)

29. Was Rhode Island Supreme Court Rule 42 and all of its subparts unconstitutionally applied to respondent attorney, Betty O. Muka, in relation to the disciplinary proceedings against her? (answer sought: yes)

30. Was Rhode Island Disciplinary Rule 8-102(B) unconstitutionally applied to respondent attorney, Betty O. Muka, in relation to the disciplinary proceedings against her? (answer sought: yes)

31. Was Rhode Island Disciplinary Rule 7-106, entitled "Trial Conduct", subsection (C) unconstitutionally, unlawfully and/or erroneously applied to respondent attorney, Betty O. Muka's, post-trial filing of her motion & affidavit upon personal knowledge in support of her timely motion for a new trial in behalf of her client, and her post-trial filing of her affirmed "Objections and Statement of Facts Con-

cerning Judge Thomas H. Needham (and others)" which was incorporated by reference and attachment to such affidavit filed, as required, with the clerk of the Rhode Island Superior Court pursuant to its Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 59(a), (b), and (c) and 5(e), etc.? (answer sought: yes)

32. Was Rhode Island Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(1), (2) and (6) unconstitutionally, unlawfully and/or erroneously applied to respondent attorney, Betty O. Muka's timely filing of such motion papers for a new trial, especially after the duly noticed motion for a new trial was heard and neither the presiding judge nor the opposing counsel (both accused of misconduct in court and out of court which materially altered the course of the trial and prejudiced the rights of the plaintiff and deprived him of a fair trial on his

medical malpractice claims) disputed any statement made in the motion papers for a new trial, and such statements were uncontested and undisputed on the record of that civil case, and those uncontested issues made res judicata thereby and thus unreviewable in any other court of law except by appeal (which opposing counsel never did take), and unreviewable by way of disciplinary proceedings initiated by a person without standing to raise the issue in any court and without personal knowledge of the facts stated in his petition which was knowingly falsely verified after no investigation whatsoever of the facts to which he swore, and thereby committed felonious perjury? (answer sought: yes)

33. Since plaintiff's attorney in the medical malpractice case, i.e. respondent attorney Betty O. Muka, had already timely

filed plaintiff's Notice of Appeal and ordered the trial transcript and the Rhode Island Supreme Court had issued an order that the case be fully briefed for the appeal instead of disposed of summarilly, only the Rhode Island Supreme Court in connection with the hearing of such appeal had jurisdiction to consider the issues raised by plaintiff-appellant on that appeal, none of which involved any issue of fact on the motion for a new trial and which facts appeared uncontested on the record and required the Rhode Island Supreme Court to accept them as established, instead of to conduct new hearings under the guise of disciplinary proceedings to create issues of fact that were never raised in the malpractice case below, and to suspend plaintiff-appellant's attorney from the practice of law before the appeal brief was filed and to thus obstruct the appeal of the

medical malpractice case not only by removing plaintiff-appellant's attorney, but by deliberately prejudicing all members of the Rhode Island Supreme Court by conducting their own original investigation so as to make them incapable of judging the appeal on the record below as opposed to the additional record created by the court itself under depraved and unconstitutional procedures and actions of their own, thus the Rhode Island Supreme Court wrongfully exercised original jurisdiction over the disciplinary proceedings against respondent attorney Betty O. Muka, and in doing so it obstructed the appeal of the medical malpractice case in which the Rhode Island Supreme Court did have only appellate jurisdiction, which was an unconstitutional and unlawful perversion of the law and of the powers of the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Is that statement true? (answer sought: yes)

34. Since Rhode Island Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A)(3) prevents an attorney from neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him, and since the Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59 authorizes a motion for a new trial within 10 days after the entry of judgment, and since Rhode Island General Laws Section 8-2-16 gives jurisdiction to the Superior Court (where the medical malpractice trial occurred) over motions for new trials as may be provided by law, and since the acts of the trial judge and opposing attorney and insurance company defending the defendant and hired attorney for the ex parte contact with the trial judge which caused the trial judge to remove from the stand the testifying expert urologist required to prove the violations of the standards of care by defendant urologist, after which the trial judge granted a motion for a directed verdict against plaintiff for a failure to

produce the very expert testimony that he had obstructed - all constituted grounds upon which a new trial could be based, was it a violation of respondent attorney's (plaintiff-appellant's attorney in the medical malpractice case and appeal) constitutional, statutory, common law and/or civil rights and/or an abuse of discretion for the Rhode Island Supreme COurt to subject respondent attorney, Betty O. Muka, to disciplinary proceedings for filing the precise motion papers for a new trial necessary to carry out her professional duties to her client under the applicable and controlling law? (answer sought: yes)

35. Since Rhode Island Disciplinary Rules 1-103(A) and (B) require a licensed attorney to report professional misconduct of other attorneys and judicial misconduct to the court or other authorities empowered to investigate or act upon such

violations, and since the acts of the other attorneys in the medical malpractice case constituted violations of specific Disciplinary Rules of the Rhode Island Code of Professional Responsibility, and since the acts of the trial judge constituted violations of specific Rhode Island Cannons of Judicial Ethics, and since the respondent attorney (plaintiff's attorney in the medical malpractice case) stated under oath in her affidavit and objections and statement of facts, upon personal knowledge, what the acts were that they all did, and what specific Disciplinary Rule and Cannon each act violated, which deprived the medical malpractice plaintiff of a fair trial and were grounds for a new trial, in the motion papers for a new trial, and filed such papers with the Superior Court Clerk as required for the motion to be heard for a new trial, which was also notifica-

tion required to be given to the court pursuant to DR 1-103(A) and (B), and also filed a formal complaint supported by such affirmed "Objections and Statement of Fact Concerning Judge Thomas H. Needham (and others)" with the Rhode Island "Commission on Judicial Tenure and Discipline" which is purportedly authorized by the Rhode Island Supreme Court under "Rules of the Commission on Judicial Tenure and Discipline" to receive complaints, conduct hearings, and recommend the disposition of such to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, and which filing fulfilled respondent attorney, Betty O. Muka's, duties under DR 1-103(B) to report such judicial misconduct, and the filing of the motion papers for a new trial also placed upon the trial court record evidence of such professional and judicial misconduct which occurred both in court and outside of court (which would not otherwise appear on the record) so tha

such matters would be a part of the record before the Rhode Island Supreme Court for review in case the motion for a new trial was unsuccessful, thereby evidencing grounds for reversal of the trial court by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, which it was plintiff's attorney in the medical malpractice case (respondent attorney, Betty O. Muka in the disciplinary proceedings based upon such new trial motion papers) duty to do in order to preserve his rights on such issues for appeal, was it a violation of respondent attorney's constitutional, statutory, civil and/or common law rights, and/or an abuse of discretion to subject plaintiff-appellant's attorney in the medical malpractice case (Betty O. Muka) to disciplinary proceedings for doing those very specific and necessary acts? (answer sought: yes)

36. In the Order dated April 19, 1985

by the Rhode Island Supreme Court after the conclusion of the disciplinary hearings presided over by 4 of the 5 Rhode Island Supreme Court judges (all except Chief Judge Joseph A. Bevilacqua who recused himself without stating any reasons but who was at that time threatened with disciplinary action and is currently suspended for judicial misconduct based upon associations with organized crime figures), did the Rhode Island Supreme Court deliberately and intentionally and with actual malice publish the false statment that respondent attorney "accused Justice Needham of ... accepting a 'pay-off' of $125,000" when no such statement appeared in any of the motion papers for a new trial, which were the sole basis of the disciplinary proceedings against respondent attorney, Betty O. Muka, and by way of such Order did the Rhode Island Supreme Court deliberately paint responden

attorney Muka in a false light and damage her reputation by releasing such false order to the Providence Journal for publication throughout Rhode Island and neighboring states and the nation, in retaliation for respondent attorney, Betty O. Muka, performing her professional duties to her client and to the judiciary by reporting the acts of the trial justice and several attorneys connected with the case, using very carefully worded statements which the Rhode Island Supreme Court misquoted and misinterpreted despite the fact that the order was disproved by documentary evidence before the Court? (answer sought: yes)

XX. Does such Order of April 19, 1985 show on p. 2 thereof that the Rhode Island Supreme Court presided over the disciplinary hearings of respondent-attorney, Betty O. Muka, because she

had filed disciplinary complaints against virtually all members of the disciplinary board, thus violating its own Rhode Island Supreme Court Rule 42-6(b) which requires that former members of the Disciplinary Board are authorized to sit instead? (answer sought: yes)

38. The order dated April 19, 1985 states that the court undertook the task of acting as a fact-finding body as well as the duty of ultimate determination in respect to the imposition of disciplinary sanctions "under the rule of necessity." Can any court fabricated and named rule create jurisdiction that the court does not have? (answer sought: no)

39. Was it "necessary" that the Rhode Island Supreme Court exercise <u>original</u> jurisdiction over a disciplinary proceeding based directly and precisely upon issues coming before it under their

legitimate appellate jurisdiction and which issues were res judicata in any other proceeding except the appellate one? (answer sought: no)

40. After claiming in its Order dated April 19, 1985 that the Rhode Island Supreme Court "undertook the task of acting as a fact-finding body", did the Rhode Island Supreme Court show by the very same order that it made absolutely no findings of fact, did not consider any allegations made in Disciplinary Counsel's petitions against respondent-attorney, and did not show that any of them were proved by Disciplinary Counsel? (answer sought: yes)

41. By stating in its Order dated April 19, 1985 that "During the hearings before this court, Mrs. Muka consistently manifested a lack of any appreciation for her obligations as a member of the bar to sup-

port the truth" did the Rhode Island Supreme Court manifest its unconstitutional and reversible error of holding respondent attorney responsible for the burden of proof when the burden of proof of the disciplinary petition was upon Disciplinary Counsel? (answer sought: yes)

42. Did the Order dated April 19, 1985 completely fail to state the nature of the allegations in the disciplinary petitions against respondent attorney, Betty O. Muka, any facts alleged there, any proof of any such facts, or even any reference to any disciplinary rules purportedly violated? (answer sought: yes)

43. Did the Order dated April 19, 1985, showing 10 all-day hearings before the Rhode Island Supreme Court, discuss even one item of evidence presented by any of the parties? (answer sought: no)

44. Was the Order dated April 19, 1985 completely devoid of any citation or quotation of any authority in law by way of any constitution or statute or common law or case law? (answer sought: yes)

45. Was the Order dated April 19, 1985 completely devoid of any finding of fact or conclusion of law? (answer sought: yes)

46. When the Order dated April 19, 1985 stated "For the reasons stated, Mrs. Betty O. Muka is hereby suspended from the practice of law, and a complete opinion will follow setting forth in greater detail the reasons for this action and any further disciplinary action to be taken in our final decision" did the Rhode Island Supreme Court deprive respondent-attorney Betty O. Muka of due process of law and deprive her of her valuable property right in her license to practice law before

making the findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which every judicial decision must be based before making the decision and before taking any action thereon? (answer sought: yes)

47. Since Rhode Island Supreme Court Rule 42-6(b) requires the Disciplinary Board to submit findings and recommendati within sixty (60) days after the conclusion of disciplinary hearings before it and the submission of briefs, if any, has the Rhode Island Supreme Court violated its own rule by repeatedly refusing throughout every hearing session to allow respondent attorney to respond to questio of law raised by the justices themselves as excuses to prevent tesifying witnesses from answering questions put to them on point, by repeatedly telling respondent-attorney that she would be allowed to argue the law at the end of the hearings,

after the evidence was closed and it was too late to recall the witnesses whose answers were needed, and at the end of the evidence refusing to accept the brief of respondent-attorney which she requested permission to file with the court, then in the Order of April 19, 1985 claimed that respondent-attorney "displayed not even the rudimentary knowledge of basic substantive and procedural law relating to the malpractice case in issue (when it wasn't in issue during the disciplinary proceedings and the Court stopped respondent-attorney many times with the admonition that such facts and law were not the subject of the disciplinary proceedings and could not be stated there) or relating to the disciplinary procedure before this court (when the Court was violating all of the parts of Rhode Island Supreme Court Rule 42 and all of its subparts, and respondent-attorney was con-

stantly objecting on the record that the procedural rules were being violated and that the laws of evidence were being violated and that the Court was making up the rules as it went along, etc.), and by failing to produce within almost 90 days of the April 19, 1985 suspension order taking immediate action against respondent attorney, Betty O. Muka, any findings of fact or conclusions of law whatsoever? (answer sought: yes)

48. Do the conclusory "lack of evidence" type remarks in the Order dated April 19, 1985 have any relationship to any Disciplinary Rule in the entire Rhode Island Code of Professional Responsibility for which discipline can be imposed? (answer sought: no)

49. When the United States Supreme Court reviews the entire file of the disciplinary proceedings both before, during and

after the Rhode Island Supreme Court hearings, including the trial transcripts and documentary and physical evidence at trial, will it find that every statement made by respondent-attorney, Betty O. Muka, in her motion papers for a new trial was evidenced during the hearings, and most of it was also admitted under oath by the persons who did the acts of judicial and professional misconduct she complained about which deprived her client of a fair trial? (answer sought: yes)

50. When the United States Supreme Court reviews such entire file, will it find that the Rhode Island Supreme Court members are a part of the organized crime complained about by respondent-attorney, Betty O. Muka, and that each member of the Rhode Island Supreme Court committed overt acts in support of organized crime on the record? (answer sought: yes)

51. Contrary to the Order dated April 19, 1985, the Muka motion papers for a new trial did not accuse Judge Needham or Judge Rodgers or Atty. Dolan of conspiring to suborn perjury, nor Justice Needham of accepting a "pay-off" of $125,000, and not having ever alleged such, it is no wonder that there was no attempt to prove any such statements to be true, but that could not possibly have any relation to any professional misconduct by respondent-attorney Muka; only judicial misconduct by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in publishing a false version of the Muka papers in its Order of suspension. Is that true? (answer sought: yes

52. Contrary to the Order dated April 19, 1985, the Muka motion papers for a new trial did not accuse Judge Needham of "being a member of organized crime", and no failure to prove that unstated

statement could possibly reflect upon Mrs. Muka's license to practice law. Is that true? (answer sought: yes)

53. Are the Order dated April 19, 1985 and the opinion-order dated Dec. 5, 1986 against the weight of the evidence, including no evidence in most instances? (answer sought: yes)

54. Should the United States Supreme Court consider facts not of record in the proceedings below but which influenced the outcome of the disciplinary hearings, including that Atty. Muka had filed a formal complaint against Chief Judge Bevilacqua's son, John, and against Disciplinary Counsel and Disciplinary Board members for not prosecuting John and others, and the Chief Judge directed Disciplinary Counsel to prosecute Atty. Muka immediately thereafter, and the Supreme Court judges quashed Atty. Muka's subpoena deuces tecum to produce such records showing organized crime's influence? (answer sought: yes)

55. Was there any other denial of federal right whether or not capable in itself of being brought here by appeal? (answer sought: Yes)

15.1(b) LIST OF PARTIES

Frank A. Carter, Jr., Chief Disciplinary counsel, was the only named party, but during the hearings his role was performed by Kathleen Managhan who had been appointed by the Rhode Island Supreme Court to do so, and during the hearings the 4 Rhode Island Supreme Cou judges presiding (Thomas F. Kelleher, Joseph R. Weisberger, Florence Kerins Murray, and Donald F. Shea) essentially became parties on the side of Disciplinary Counsel and also became witnesses by way of their accusations and testimony from the bench. Rhode Island Supreme Court Justice Joseph A. Bevilacqua was a silent party on the side of Disciplinary Counsel, in that he conspired with Mr. Carter to have the proceedings initiated and heard by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, but recused himself during the first day of the hearings.

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15.1(d) REPORTS OF OPINIONS BELOW

The entire proceedings were confidential and secret, despite respondent-attorney's request that they be public. The Order is reported at 491 A.2d 334. There were never any opinions in the entire case, only orders (see 15.1(j)(i) and (ii)).

15.1(e) JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS

15.1(e)(i) Nature of the Proceeding

The nature of the proceeding below was never determined, although placed in question. Without constitutional or statutory authority to do so, the Rhode Island Supreme Court (minus the Chief Justice who recused himself) held original secret somewhat trial-type hearings which were devoid of almost all characteristics of a trial, over respondent-attorney's objections to its lack of original subject matter jurisdiction to preside over the matters and lack of personal jurisdic-

tion over her, and other defenses in law, all of which were pleaded and none of which were allowed to be stated or supported during the hearings in which the Rhode Island Supreme Court directed respondent attorney to not orally state any arguments on point of law and to not file any brief on any point of law, repeatedly rejecting her attempts to do such. The proceedings were purportedly disciplinary in nature, against Betty O. Muka, an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Rhode Island. They resulted in an order indefinately suspending her from the practice of law in Rhode Island, a penalty unauthorized by any law in Rhode Island, when there had not been any findings of fact or conclusions of law or any opinion created before such final order. During the hearings Rhode Island Supreme Court Justice Joseph R. Weisberger stated that the proceedings were a "civil trial."

But the respondent-attorney had never been served with any civil process. The Court obstructed all of respondent-attorney's attempts to place the relevant and controlling law into evidence during her own testimony under oath about reading such law from official publications of the law and trying to offer such official publications as full exhibits to be placed into evidence. This was in defense of charges that respondent-attorney had "no basis in law" for her purported misconduct of timely filing her motion for a new trial in behalf of her client following a jury trial in a medical malpractice case. Without further proceedings, after 8 months, an opinion and disbarment order unrelated to the charges or the evidence was filed.

15.1(e)(ii) Dates of Entry

The opinion-disbarment order was 12/5/85. The Order of Suspension for an indefinate length of time was filed April 19, 1985. (Not served until April 29, 1985.)

15.1(e)(iii) Statute

At least two statutory provisions confer jurisdiction on the United States Supreme

Court to review the original and final order of the Rhode Island Supreme Court suspending respondent-attorney, Betty O. Muka, indefinately from the practice of law. An appeal is authorized by Section 1257(2) of Title 28 of the United States Code, because respondent-attorney, Betty O. Muka, in her pleadings drew into question the validity of Rhode Island Supreme Court Rule 42 and its subparts and other rules that the Rhode Island Supreme Court made as it went along, which Rhode Island Supreme Court Rules, when properly approved in advance, and when effective, supercede statutory regulations in conflict therewith, pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws, Title 8, Chapter 6, Section 2. Disciplinary rules 8-102(B) and 7-106(C)(4) of the Rhode Island Code of Professional Responsibility were challenged as an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected speech in violation of the First Amend-

ment to the United States Constitution, and Rhode Island Supreme Court Rule 42 and its subparts (42-1 through 42-22) were challenged as unconstitutional in violation of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution both in the pleadings and during the proceedings in which the rules being made up as the Court went along were also challenged. The Order of indefinite suspension and subsequent opinion-order of disbarment we in favor of the validity of the challeng rules, indirectly, by taking action purportedly based on their validity, withou any supporting opinion. A writ of certiorari is also authorized by Section 1257(3) of Title 28 of the United States Code, because in the pleadings and papers prior to the hearings and during the hear ings themselves the validity of the Rhod Island Supreme Court Rule 42 and its sub parts, and the rules being made up as th went along, and disciplinary rules were

drawn into question on the grounds that they were repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States, particularly the First and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution, and respondent-attorney specially claimed the privileges of a United States citizen.

15.1(f) Citations to Provisions

(See Appendix for provisions verbatum) Rhode Island Const., Art. X and Amendment XII, Rhode Island Supreme Court Rule 42 (including 42-1, 42-2, 42-3(a), (b) and (c), 42-4(a), (c)(I), (2) and (4), 42-5(a), (b)(1), (2), (3) and (6), 42-6 (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e), 42-7, 42-11, and 42-21), Rhode Island General Laws 8-6-2, United States Constitution, Article VI and Amendments XIV and I, Rhode Island Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A) and (B), 7-102(A)(1), (2) and (6), 7-106(C), and 8-102(B), etc.

15.1(g) STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Betty O. Muka, an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Rhode Island was trial attorney for the plaintiff in the case of Raymond Sousa v. Rosalind Chaset in her capacity as the Executrix of the Estate of the late Nathan D. Chase M.D. tried to a jury in the Rhode Island Superior Court as P.C. No. 78-1969 on January 31, February 1, 2, 6, 7, 8 and 9. Superior Court Justice Thomas H. Needham presided over the jury trial and at the close of the plaintiff's case granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The following day Atty. Muka filed a formal complaint against Judge Needham with the Rhode Island Commission on Judicial Tenure and Discipline, supported by an affirmed document entitled "Objections and Statement of Facts Concerning Judge Thomas H. Needham (and others)" which subsequently became identified as "Ex. A

Ex. A stated facts about events that happened both in court and out of court which constituted direct violations of the Cannons of Judicial Ethics by Judge Needham and violations of specific disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility by several attorneys, including opposing counsel (Atty. David W. Carroll) who advised plaintiff's expert urologist (Dr. John B. Lawlor) that he didn't need to testify when he came to court to do just that, and advised Dr. Lawlor to state that he didn't want to testify when he took the stand, and when Judge Needham stopped the trial to give Dr. Lawlor an opportunity to retain counsel that he had not sought before taking the stand, Atty. Carroll conspired with an officer of defendant's insurer (William Egan, claims adjuster for the Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriters ASsociation of Rhode Island, who was at the trial observing it) to sud-

denly retain one of the insurer's regula
attorneys (John F. Dolan) as Dr. Lawlor'
attorney, after which Atty. Dolan went i
secret to Judge Needham's chambers and
obtained Judge Needham's agreement to
take Dr. Lawlor off the stand, without
any notice to plaintiff's attorney who
was in the courtroom and without giving
Atty. Muka any opportunity to oppose suc
action. Judge Needham dismissed Dr.
Lawlor first, and then gave Atty. Muka
an opportunity to comment, after it was
too late. The motion for a directed ver
dict was substantially based upon Judge
Needham finding a failure of plaintiff
to put into evidence the expert opinion
of an urologist, i.e. the aborted testi-
mony of Dr. Lawlor. Dr. Lawlor had prio
to trial given the expert opinions neede
to Atty. Muka, had earlier been appointe
by court order to be the expert urologis
in the case, and was additionally sub-

poenaed to testify, and in court showed such court order and subpoena after he was dismissed by Judge Needham but before he left the stand, but Judge Needham refused to allow him to testify. In addition to filing Ex. A with the formal complaint to the Commission, which was her duty to do under DR 103(A) and (B), Atty. Muka filed a copy of Ex. A in the Superior Court Clerk's Office to be placed in the file of the Sousa v. Chaset case, just before filing the formal complaint, and, within the 10-day limit after judgment filed a Motion for a New Trial supported with Atty. Muka's own affidavit upon personal knowledge, which incorporated Ex. A into it by reference, which told of more facts and violations of judicial and professional ethics which deprived her client of a fair trial and were lawful and proper grounds for a new trial. At the hearing of the motion for a New Trial there were

no opposing affidavits or memorandums of law, but Judge Needham (who had been serv by Atty. Muka with a copy of her formal c plaint and Ex. A against him) denied the motion for a purported lack of jurisdicti (despite R.I.G.L. 8-2-16 jurisdiction ove motions for a new trial and R.C.P. 59 whi authorized it), and stated from the bench that he was going to give a copy of such motion papers to the Rhode Island Discipli ary Counsel without comment. Disciplinar Counsel, Frank A. Carter, Jr., without an personal knowledge of the facts and witho conducting any investigation, filed two petitions against Atty. Muka which Mr. Ca ter verified, which claimed that there wa "no basis in fact or law" for the statemen made in her notice of motion for a new tr and supporting affidavit and Ex. A incorp rated into it and also attached to it, an stated that Atty. Muka had violated DR 7- 106(C) entitled "trial conduct" by filing

such motion papers for a new trial, after the trial was over, and that Atty. Muka had violated DR 8-102(B) by making accusations against a judge, which Mr. Carter imagined were false. Atty. Muka responded to informal and then formal charges against her, and when she heard a rumor that the Rhode Island Supreme Court was going to hear the hearings instead of the Disciplinary Board authorized by Supreme Court Rule 42-6, Atty. Muka included challenges to their original jurisdiction, etc. Chief Judge Joseph A. Bevilacqua who had secretly agreed with Mr. Carter to prosecute Atty. Muka before any complaints at all had been filed, (and who was subsequently ~~suspended and is under impeachment~~ at present for his admitted contacts with organized crime figures), recused himself, and the other 4 Rhode Island Supreme Court judges presided over the hearings. During the entire proceedings before and during the hearings, Atty.

Muka's constitutional, statutory, common law, and civil rights, and even her right under Rhode Island Supreme Court rule 42 et seq were grossly violated: pre-trial discovery was prohibited, subpoenas were all obstructed in advance, a few allowed were quashed without motion, the Court directed Atty. Muka to not serve others, no opening statements were allowed, the 10 days of hearings (2 per month) were marked by hundreds of interruptions from the bench, including testimony from the bench that was unsworn and often false, no rules of evidence were followed, Atty. Muka was prevented from countering arguments of law proposed erroneously from the bench to obstruct answers of witnesses being cross-examined by her, was told that she could argue the law at the end of the hearings, was denied her request to submit a brief on the law at the end of the hearings, and was ordered suspended in-

definately from the practice of law without any findings of fact or conclusions of law or opinion, in an order which made no reference to any law or any disciplinary rule or any violation thereof. At the haarings the judge and attorneys whose conduct had been challenged by Atty. Muka were produced by the Disciplinary Counsel and they admitted under oath most of the statements Atty. Muka had made in her motion papers for a new trial, and furthermore many of them admitted that what they had done was wrong. The Order of suspension claimed that Atty. Muka had made certain statements that Atty. Muka never did make, and said that Atty. Muka had failed in her duty to support the truth and that Atty. Muka was ignorant of the law and procedures, when they never allowed Atty. Muka to state her view of the law and she objected to the violation of the procedural rules and her constitutional rights, and

she herself gave sworn testimony support
ing 100% of her statements made in her
challenged motion papers, most of which
was corroborated by many witnesses. An
opinion-order of disbarment 8 months
later was unrelated to the charges and t
evidence and was grossly inadequate & un

15.1(h) REASON FOR FULL BRIEFS

The questions presented are so substanti
as to require plenary consideration with
full briefs on the merits and oral argu-
ment for their resolution by reason of
the following: 1. This is a case of firs
impression. Never before has an attorne
who promptly filed appropriate papers in
the interest of their client been subjec
to disciplinary proceedings for the con-
tent of the papers, a first Amendment ri
and an absolute privilege for an attorne
2. If attorneys can be subjected to disc
plinary proceedings based upon the conte
of their appropriately filed papers, the
the profession is subject to coercion an
the interests of the public can never be

served. 3. When the highest court of a state grossly and flagrantly violates all of its own rules, all of the commonly accepted rules of Constitutional due process and equal protection of the law, and itself engages in a totally unauthorized original proceeding which is not subject to review by any court in the state, then the United States Supreme Court is the only court of review possible, and because it takes only about 4% of matters submitted to it, there is a great probability of making such practices nationwide in their scope because of what the highest court in Rhode Island has done and has reported publicly. 4. What the Rhode Island Supreme Court has done will sweep the nation like wildfire if it is not immediately nipped in the bud. 5. The integrity of the entire legal profession, as well as the judiciary itself, is in grave danger, should the entire matter not be thoroughly considered

and adjudicated in detail and reversed. 6. When the highest court of a state issues such a drastic order as indefinite suspension from the practice of law, and makes no reference to any law or any violation of any disciplinary rule, and states that it will act first and then think of reasons why later, and doesn't ever issue any opinion until 8 months it disbars on unevidenced and unrelated incidents misstated and misconstrued and false, it is imperative that the only appellate court that exists embark upon a thorough review of the legal aspects of the matter which the highest court of the State of Rhode Island has proceeded to ignore while it takes final action. 7. This is especially so because the Chief Justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court has just agreed to a 4-month suspension from his judicial duties because of his contacts with organized crime, and he is the one who directed the prosecution of Atty. Muka when there was no complaint against her and she per-

formed her professional duties of reporting the judicial misconduct and professional misconduct that she personally observed to the proper authorities, as well as moved to protect the interests of her client.

15.1(i)(none)

15.1(j) APPENDIX FOLLOWS.

28 U.S.C. 2403(b) may be applicable. The Rhode Island Attorney General is being served.

Respectfully submitted,

Mrs. Betty O. Muka

Mrs. Betty O. Muka
Appellant
113 Kay St.
Ithaca, N. Y. 14850
(607) 257-2016

15.1(j) APPENDIX

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Rhode Island Constitution

[illegible] appli-

cation, including some of the

constitutional questions raised [illegible]

15.1(j) APPENDIX

15.1(j)(i) Final opinion-order 12/5/85

0790b

December 5, 1985

Supreme Court

No. 85-188-M.P.

Frank A. Carter, Jr., :

Chief Disciplinary Counsel :

v. :

Betty O. Muka. :

OPINION

PER CURIAM. This opinion supplements an order entered by this court in the above-entitled disciplinary proceeding on April 19, 1985.[1] In the order, this court determined that the respondent, Betty O. Muka, (1) had violated certain disciplinary rules and (2) was not qualified to practice law in this jurisdiction. The court suspended her right to practice pending publication of this opinion and the imposition of any further disciplinary action.

The respondent has been a member of the

1 See appendix A.

Rhode Island Bar since June 30, 1983. W
in the year of her admission, the court'
disciplinary counsel lodged two
disciplinary petitions with the
court's disciplinary board.
The petitions charged respondent with un
professional conduct while acting as cou
sel to a plaintiff in a Superior Court m
cal-malpractice action. The trial justi
had directed a verdict for the defendant
in the malpractice action, and the charg
of unprofessional conduct stemmed from t
submission of two documents filed by res
dent in the malpractice case.

One petition concerned a document enti
"Objections and Statement of Facts conce
ing Judge Thomas H. Needham (and others)
The other petition was generated by a do
ment designated by the respondent "RCP R
59 Motion for a New Trial" with a suppor
ing affidavit.

In each of these documents, respondent

made a variety of unsupported allegations against several judges, attorneys, court personnel, and members of the public. The charges included the crimes of conspiracy, obstruction of justice, suborning perjury, "pay offs," and membership in the "Judicial Mafia."

Throughout the lengthy hearings conducted before this court, respondent demonstrated a total lack of knowledge of basic substantive and procedural law. She failed to recognize the fact that she had altered an exhibit in a case on appeal to this court and freely admitted that she stapled various papers together, added a more complete description of the documents, and provided an index to the newly organized papers "in order that the court would be able to understand what they were."

In filing a motion for a new trial, respondent obviously was unaware that this court in Izzo v. Prudential Insurance Co.

114 R.I. 224, 230-31, 331 A.2d 395, 39
99 (1975), ruled that a motion for a n
trial following the direction of a jur
verdict is a nullity, and as such, the
tion would not extend the time within
an appeal could be taken. Izzo also e
sized that an appeal that was not take
within twenty days of the entry of a j
ment pursuant to the direction of a ve
was untimely and completely ineffectiv
obtaining appellate review.

During her own testimony and that of
witnesses, respondent consistently exh
ted and readily conceded that "some of
problems that (she had) with -- with t
hearing and I think with courts in gen
is the custom of separating fact from

Despite repeated attempts by the mem
of this court to explain the proceedin
respondent was unable to grasp why she
was before this court and was convince
that the burden of proof had been unju

shifted. Although she continually asserted that none of the individuals who testified had told the truth, she failed to serve process on those individuals she claimed would support her outrageous allegations.

In the course of her rambling, disordered, and at most times irrelevant testimony, respondent discussed the affidavit she had filed with her motion for a new trial. She testified that the judge, attorneys and witnesses had a duty not only to deny her allegations before this court but also to dispute her allegations of a payoff, conspiracy, and suborning perjury by filing a counteraffidavit. Because no counteraffidavit was filed respondent, apparently believing she was dealing with a motion for summary judgment, was convinced that her affidavit must be taken as true and her allegations admitted as a matter of law. However, respondent failed to present any evidence to support her allegations, except for her own incredible

testimony. Thus, the members of this co
sitting in a unique position as factfind
ers, are convinced that her reckless all
gations are unworthy of belief.

After our review of the testimony and
dence in the case, we find that the chie
disciplinary counsel, has proven not onl
by clear and convincing evidence but al
beyond a reasonable doubt that responden
has violated each of the disciplinary r
set forth in his two petitions. Said d
plinary rules are set forth in full in
pendix B of this opinion. We note espe
ly that respondent did knowingly, with
less disregard of the truth make false
extravagant accusations against Justice
Needham. We further note that by her c
duct during the trial of Raymond Souza
Chaset et al., No. 78-1969-C.A., and by
her allegations in documents filed in s
port of a motion for new trial, she has
gaged in vituperative and unsupported a

cusations against Justice Needham, members of the bar, and other persons as set forth in our order, either with actual knowledge of the falsity of said accusations or with reckless disregard of whether they were true or false.

In determining an appropriate disciplinary sanction in respect to respondent, we must consider not only her actions in regard to the specific charges against her that have been proven before us but also conduct of a similar type set forth in reported cases of the State of New York. In People v. Muka, 72 A.D.2d 649, 421 N.Y.S. 2d 438 (1979), the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York in 1979 sustained a conviction of respondent for unlawful imprisonment in the second degree arising out of her attempts to impose a citizen's arrest upon the District Attorney of Tompkins County of New York because he had refused to bring 333 charges

against various public officials for ac-
tivities perceived by her to be in viola-
tion of the criminal law. An examinatio
of that opinion indicates that responden
had previously been admonished for not
only making false accusations but also
attempting subsequently to enforce them
by physical force in spite of the entrea
ies of law-enforcement officers to the c
trary. In that opinion the appellate di
vision characterized her brief as "excee
ingly rambling."

Earlier, in connection with the same c
respondent had sought to remove the char
pending against her, after a jury trial
been completed, to the Federal District
Court. See People of the State of New Y
v. Muka, 440 F. Supp. 33 (N.D.N.Y. 1977)
The case was returned to the state court
and in the course of the remand opinion,
the Federal District judge noted that du
ing that proceeding respondent had asked

the court to allow her to file a criminal information and complaint against a number of named individuals. The Federal District judge noted that a private citizen had no right to prosecute a federal crime. In that litigation respondent also accused the Federal Court of treating her case specially and unfairly in regard to scheduling of a motion against her. This charge was rejected.

Again, in the State of New York, respondent brought action against the state bar association, alleging that it had conspired with 140 listed persons and entities "'to deny (respondent) the equal protection of the Penal Law * * * the common law, and the federal law * * * and the provisions of the United States Constitution.'" Muka v. New Your State Bar Association, 120 Misc. 2d 897, 898, 466 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (1983). Among the entities listed as defendants were Cornell Law School, members of the

Appellate Division of the Supreme Cour
the New York State Court of Appeals, t
New York State Commission on Judicial
duct, and six Supreme Court justices i
the Sixth Judicial District. The Supr
Court justice who decided the case not
that he had also been made a defendant
prior law suits brought by respondent
was named a conspirator in the action
fore the court but was hearing the cas
under the rule of necessity. He state
in the course of his opinion that "(i)
has been Mrs. Muka's habit to sue, att
as incompetent, or call for the remova
any judge who does not render a decisi
her liking." 120 Misc. 2d at 899, 44
S. at 892. The justice of the Supreme
Court of New York further noted that
December 20, 1977, respondent had comm
an action in the United States Distri
Court for the Northern District of New
York naming more than 100 defendants,

cluding the New York State Bar Association, which allegedly conspired to deprive her of her civil rights. The action was dismissed on the merits by United States District Court Judge Howard G. Munson in a memorandum decision and order dated October 30, 1978, in which he ruled: "The complaint in this case is 'patently without merit' and 'wholly insubstantial and frivolous.'" Id.

Ultimately, the justice of the Supreme Court of New York referred to two other actions that had been brought against multiple defendants in 1979 and 1981. We concluded that respondent, who was then a graduate of a law school but not an attorney-at-law, had on August 16, 1978 brought suit against United States District Judge James M. Foley and named as other defendant Governor Hugh Carey of the State of New York; the State Attorney General; the United States Attorney General, Griffin Bell;

both Houses of the New York State Legis
lature and each and every member there
the American Bar Association; the chief
judge of the New York State Court of Ap
the Dean of the Cornell Law School; and
host of judges. As a result of this an
other baseless and harassing litigation
the justice of the Supreme Court of New
York enjoined respondent from commencin
any civil action against the New York S
Bar Association unless she was represen
by an attorney duly licensed to practic
law in the State of New York.

We mention the foregoing incidents on
to indicate that the respondent's condu
in respect to the violation of disciplin
rules in this state and her extravagant
unfounded accusations against members o
the bar, the judiciary, and the medical
profession in Rhode Island are not uniq
aberrations but represent a course of c
duct in which she has been engaged for

than a decade.[2] This course of conduct, when considered in the context of the events in the present case discloses beyond any doubt that the respondent is not qualified to practice law in this state and that it would be a danger to the public to allow her to represent litigants in the role of a practicing attorney. Not only is her procedural knowledge patently inadequate but she has manifested in this state, and also in the State of New York, an utter disregard for the requirements of law and the rights of any person who has the temerity to disagree with her or refuses to grant whatever request or demand the respondent may make upon him or her. Taking into ac-

---

2 For an additional example of respondent's unprofessional conduct and blatantly false accusations, see D'Arezzo v. Estate of Catherine Christy, No. 84-158-A (R.I., filed Oct. 10, 1985).

count these proven attributes and char
istics, we feel it is incumbent upon t
court to take appropriate measures to
tect the people of the State of Rhode
land against the respondent's harassin
litigation and malicious prosecution.
is our opinion that only an order of d
barment will provide such protection.

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered an
directed that the respondent, Betty O.
ka, is hereby disbarred from the pract
of law before the courts of this state.
She is also ordered to comply with the
visions of Supreme Court Rule 42-15 (a)
and (b) and to furnish the clerk of thi
court on or before December 16, 1985, t
names and addresses of any and all clie
presently represented by her.

Chief Justice Bevilacqua did not part
ipate.

0790b Appendix B

"DR 7-102. Representing a Client Within the Bounds of the Law.

(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:

(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another.

(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.

* * *

(6) Participate in the creation or preservation of evidence when he knows

or it is obvious that the eviden
is false."

"DR 7-106. Trial Conduct.

* * *

(C) In appearing in his professional
pacity before a tribunal, a lawye
shall not:

* * *

(4) Assert his personal opinion as t
the justness of a cause, as to t
credibility of a witness, as to
culpability of a civil litigant,
as to the guilt of innocence of
accused; but he may argue, on hi
analysis of the evidence, for an
sition or conclusion with respec
the matters stated herein.

* * *

(6) Engage in undignified or discour
conduct which is degrading to a
bunal."

APPENDIX A

0652c

Supreme Court

No. DB-247

No. DB-248

85-188 M.P.

Frank A. Carter, Jr.,
Chief Disciplinary Counsel :

v. :

Betty O. Muka :

ORDER

This matter is before us pursuant to two disciplinary petitions brought by Frank A. Carter, Jr., Chief Disciplinary Counsel (Carter). These petitions are based upon documents filed by Betty O. Muka in support of a motion for new trial in respect to a medical malpractice case heard in the Superior Court entitled Raymond Sousa v. Rosalind Chaset, in her capacity as the Executrix of the late Nathan D. Chaset, M.D., C.A. No. 78-1969.

In the documents filed in support of t
motion for new trial, the respondent,
ty O. Muka, accused the trial justice,
Thomas H. Needham, Justice Joseph F. K
gers, Jr., and Attorneys David W. Carr
Joseph A. Kelly, and John F. Dolan of
spiring to suborn perjury and to obstr
justice in order to deprive her client
a fair trial. She further accused Jus
Needham of being a member of organized
crime and of accepting a "pay-off" of
$125,000 in order to terminate the mal
practice case favorably to the defenda
She also accused in these documents Dr
John B. Lawlor of deliberately giving
perjured testimony.

Because the respondent had filed co
plaints against virtually all members
the disciplinary board which would ord
narilly have been the original hearing
tribunal in this matter, the members o
that board recused themselves from par

ticipating in an evidentiary hearing of the subject petitions. Therefore, this court undertook the task of acting as a fact-finding body as well as the duty of ultimate determination in respect to the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. This function has been performed by this court under the rule of necessity.

This court began hearing evidence in this matter on November 15, 1984, and continued hearings on November 30, December 10, and December 17, 1984. The hearings continued January 18, January 28, February 18, February 25, April 15 and April 16, 1985. In the course of the evidentiary hearings, not one shred of evidence has been produced to support any of these extravagant accusations on the part of Betty O. Muka. Consequently, the court is constrained to find as a fact that her accusations could not have been based on any information sufficient to form a rea-

sonable or sincere belief that such a
sations were made either with actual k
ledge of their falsity or with reckles
disregard of whether they were false o
not. She has deliberately and grievou
maligned members of the Superior Court
and members of the bar of hitherto out
standing and unblemished reputation.

Her own tape-recorded evidence of a
conversation with Dr. Lawlor, an outst
ing member of the medical profession,
completely belies her characterization
of his testimony in court as perjured.
She recorded a conversation with Dr. L
lor and another conversation with Mr.
liam E. Egan, an adjuster for Joint Un
writing Association of Rhode Island, w
out indicating to either of them that
telephone conversations were being re
ded. However both conversations were
mitted into evidence on her motion wi
out objection. These recordings comp

ly belie her accusations concerning misconduct on the part of Dr. Lawlor or Mr. Egan.

During the hearings before this court, Mrs. Muka consistently manifested a lack of any appreciation for her obligations as a member of the bar to support the truth; she consistently mischaracterized testimony and flagrantly reasserted her unsupported accusations against members of the judiciary and the bar. She displayed not even the most rudimentary knowledge of basic substantive and procedural law relating to the malpractice case in issue or relating to the disciplinary procedure before this court.

As a consequence, we are of the opinion that Mrs. Muka has violated the disciplinary rules set forth in the petitions before this court and that she is not qualified to practice law in this state, and that it would be a disservice to the pub-

lic to allow her to continue to practice law as a member of the Rhode Island Bar.

For the reasons stated, Mrs. Betty O. Muka is hereby suspended from the practice of law, and a complete opinion will follow setting forth in greater detail the reasons for this action and any further disciplinary action to be taken in our final decision.

The respondent is directed to furnish to the clerk of this court within ten da of the date of this order the names and addresses of all clients presently repre sented by her in order that arrangements may be made to protect the interests of respondent's clients.

Chief J stice Bevilacqua did not participate.

Entered as an Order of this Court on this 19th day of April, 1985.

By Order, (signature)
Walter J. Kane, Clerk

15.1(j)(ii) Preceeding Orders

(First Order dated June 21, 1984)

Supreme Court

DB 247

DB 248

Frank A Carter, Jr., :
Chief Disciplinary Counsel :
:
v. :
:
Betty O. Muka :

ORDER

These matters presently pending before the Disciplinary Board are removed from the Disciplinary Board to this Court for hearing.

Entered as an order of this Court this 21st day of June, 1984.

BY ORDER

(signature of Beverly A Clark)

Walter J. Kane, Clerk

(letter dated October 26, 1984)

October 26, 1984

Mrs. Betty O. Muka, Esq.

113 Kay Street

Ithaca, New York 14850

In Re: Frank A. Carter, Jr. v. Betty O. Muka, File No. 84-037 and File No. 84-042

Dear Mrs. Muka:

This will confirm our telephone conversation of the above date. As I indicated to you, the Clerk of the Court and myself have reviewed the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 42-11 in connection with your request for 30 blank subpoenas in the abo matter, and we concluded that the rule do not permit the issuance of subpoenas in blank. The rule, and the practice here, require that you seek a subpoena for a named individual, and that upon such request, the clerk would issue the subpoena

Obviously, you disagree with this inte

pretation of the rule, and therefore, I indicated to you that I would submit your request for subpoenas to the court for its consideration.

Very truly yours,

(signature of Ronald A. Tutalo)

Ronald A. Tutalo

RAT/t Administrative Assistant

****

(Second order dated November 1, 1984) (Note: Respondent-attorney was never served with this order, and no copy of it can be found in the clerk's files. Only the following reference to it appears in the clerk's docket: "11/1/84 Order entered. Respondent's request for blank subpoena denied, instructed to file under rule 42-11.")

(Third Order dated November 1, 1984)

Supreme Court

No. D B. 247

No. D.B 258

Frank A. Carter, Jr.
Chief Disciplinary Counsel :

v. :

Betty O. Muka, Respondent :

ORDER

In response to the Motion for Relief filed by respondent, the following order may enter:

(1) This court has undertaken and will perform the task of hearing evidence in the above-entitled case, solely by reason of the fact that the respondent has challenged substantially the entire membership of the Disciplinary Board Therefore, it is impossible for this court to create an entirely new board for the purpose of hearing this one case. It is, of course, within the jurisdiction of this court to pass

upon matters relating to the discipline of members of the bar. This duty may be addressed either initially or by way of review of the proceedings of a body established for the purpose of disciplining or admitting members of the bar. See, e.g., Petition of Shields, 192 A.2d 430 (1963): Creditors' Service Corp. v. Cummings, 57 R.I. 291, 190 A.2 (1937); Rhode Island Bar Association v. Automobile Service Association, 55 R.I. 122, 179 A. 139, 100 A.L.R. 226 (1935); see also In Re Petition of DeOrsey, 112 R.I. 536, 312 A.2d 720 (1973).

(2) Except for the special provision that this court will hear the testimony in this case, all other rules relating to disciplinary proceedings will be applicable. The absence of a right of review within the State of Rhode Island in no wise deprives the respondent of due process, since she will be heard before the

highest tribunal in the state and the sole tribunal which has been empowered by the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island with the judicial power of the state, and said power inherently includes the admission and disciplining of members of the bar. We do note that the respondent, if aggrieved by a decicision of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, may petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States in respect to any federally protected right which she may perceive.

(3) The respondent's request that Frank A. Carter, Jr., Chief Disciplinary Counsel, be disqualified from acting in this matter is denied. Mr. Carter, although he is the complainant in the case, will not conduct the presentation of evidence. The hearing will be conducted by special counsel, Kathleen Managhan, Esquir

(4) The respondent's request for the is suance of thirty subpoenaes in blank but

signed by the clerk is hereby granted. However, the issuance of the subpoenas over the signature of the clerk does not in any constitute a determination by this court or by the clerk as to the relevancy or competence of any testimony or documents which may be sought by virtue of said subpoenaes.

(5) In respect to the taking of depositions, the provisions of Disciplinary Rule 42-11 will be controlling. This rule in pertinent part reads as follows:

> "Testimony may be taken by deposition or such other method as may be authorized by the (court) if the witness is not subject to service of subpoena or is unable to attend or testify at the hearing because of age, illness or other infirmity. A complete record of the testimony so taken shall be made and preserved."

Disciplinary Rule 42-11 does not provide for discovery proceedings either on behalf of the complainant or the respondent. It must be noted that disciplinary proceedings against an attorney are con-

fidential and therefore the taking of depositions must be strictly circumscribed.

(6) The hearing which will commence on November 14, 1984, will be limited to those matters germane to the complaint against respondent as set forth in D.B. 247 and D.B. 248. The respondent's request to consolidate this case with other cases in respect to which she may have filed complaints is denied.

Entered as an Order of this Court this 5th day of November, 1984.

By Order,

(signature of Walter J. Kane)

Walter J. Kane, Clerk

****

(Fourth Order dated November 27, 1984)

Supreme Court

No. DB 247

No. DB 248

Frank A. Carter, Jr. :
Chief Disciplinary Counsel :

v. :
:
Betty O. Muka :

ORDER

After consideration of the respondent's Motion for Assistance, it is hereby ordered that

1. a copy of the deposition taken of Joseph A. Kelly by Assistant Disciplinary Counsel be furnished to the respondent; and

2. a copy of the transcript of the disciplinary proceedings before this court be furnished to the respondent after the stenographer has filed the transcript with the clerk of this court and the clerk's staff has had a reasonable opportunity to make the requisite copy.

Entered as an Order of this Court this 27th day of November, 1984.

By Order,

(signature of Brian B. Burns)

Walter J Kane, Clerk

ENTER:

(signature of Thomas F. Kelleher)

Thomas F Kelleher

Associate Justice

November 27, 1984

****

(Fifth order dated January 10, 1985)

Supreme Court

No. D.B. 84-037

No. D.B. 84-042

Frank A. Carter, Jr., :
Chief Disciplinary Counsel :
:
v. :
:
Betty O. Muka :

ORDER

The motion of Frank A. Carter, Jr., Chief Disciplinary Counsel and the petitioner in the above-entitled disciplinary actions, to quash a subpoena duces tecum dated December 4, 1984, which was served upon him at the instance of the respondent, Betty O. Muka, is granted.

By Order

(signature of Beverly A. Clark)

Walter J. Kane, Clerk

15.1(j)(ii) Companion case order

(Bench decision dated November 14, 1984 in Betty O. Muka v. The Supreme Court of the State of Rhode Island, et al in case commenced November 13, 1984 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island, where all three judges in the district recused themselves and transferred the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire, thus changing the case number from C.A. No. 84-0622 in Rhode Island to C. 84-728-D (later changed from D to L) in New Hampshire where Chief Judge Shane Devine conducted an all-day evidentiary hearing on plaintiff's Order to Show Cause why an injunction should not issue restraining the Rhode Island Supreme Court from conducting the hearings set for November 14.)

It is now approximately 4:00 p.m. on the 14th of November. I'm about to issue from the bench my opinion in this case. There will be no other written Orders, so counsel better make careful notes.

This matter has come before the Court for a hearing on this date, November 14, 1984, on those portions of the Plaintiff's 53-page, 186-paragraph complaint which seek to enjoin certain proceedings scheduled originally to have commenced today in the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. The instant complaint was filed in the United States District Court in Providence, Rhode Island on November 13, and transferred here to permit this Court to sit by designation. The Court has this date heard the oral argument of the Plaintiff appearing pro se, as well as live testimony from Plaintiff and Frank Carter, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, appointed by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Mr. Carter is also

named as one of many defendants in the Plaintiff's complaint.

Plaintiff Betty Muka has been admitted to the practice of law in the state of Rhode Island since June of 1983. In simplified terms, she complains in this Court that attempts by Rhode Island authorities to discipline her for certain actions allegedly performed by her in the course of such legal practice comprise deprivations of certain rights which she possesses under the Constitution of the United States. As is the case in many states, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has detailed in the subsections of its Rule 42 the procedures to be followed in the event of unprofessional acts or omissions on the part of members of its bar. Generally speaking, a Court-appointed Disciplinary Board is charged with the powers and duties to investigate the conduct of an attorney on its own motion or upon complaint in writing filed

with Chief Counsel, appointed by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Upon completion of investigation by such counsel, he in turn makes recommendations to the Board as to disposition either by dismissal or further proceedings and the Board then reviews his recommendations and decides what further action is to be taken. If desired, a Respondent-Attorney may himself or herself request a formal hearing before the Board. Ordinarily when such a request is made, or a petition is filed, seeking to impose discipline, the Board schedules a hearing at which the Respondent may be represented by counsel and has the right to cross-examine and present witnesses.

Within 60 days of such hearing on a petition, the Board is required to report to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island setting forth its findings and recommendations and transferring to the Court the record of

the proceedings before it. In turn, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reviews the record and then issues its Orders.

As is clear from the proceedings before this Court, however, this Plaintiff had herself filed complaints against every member of the Disciplinary Board of the State of Rhode Island, so that the unique circumstances which were presented to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island required that Court to reach a decision as to how best to approach the complaints filed with respect to Plaintiff's conduct.

The evidence before this Court is that at least since February of 1978, when Defendant Carter became Chief Counsel to the Disciplinary Board, no other member of the Rhode Island bar has filed complaints against every member of the Disciplinary Board, although complaints have been filed against individual members thereof. Faced with this dilemma, the Rhode Island Supreme

Court accordingly decided that it would hold the evidentiary hearing and appoint ed Special C-unsel to conduct same. An Order to that effect was issued under da of November 5, 1984, setting commencemer of the proceedings before the Supreme Court of Rhode Island for 11:00 a.m. on this date, November 14.

To prevail on a claim of injunctive relief, which is the issue before this Court, in the First Circuit, a Plaintiff must satisfy a Court that the Court can find first that the Plaintiff will suffe irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; second, that such injury ou weighs any harm which granting injunctiv relief would inflict on the Defendant; third, that the Plaintiff has exhibited a likelihood of success on the merits; and fourth, that the public interest wil not be adversely affected by the grantir of the injunction. See Planned Parentho

v. Bellotti, 642 F.2d. 1006-1009, First Circuit (1981).

As Plaintiff herein, Mrs. Muka, suggests that she is deprived of due process and equal protection by virtue of the fact that the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island does not contain specific language affording to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island the power to exert disciplinary powers over its members. But the law is clear in the First Circuit that Federal Courts must render a substantial deference to a State's legitimate interest in regulation of the bar so as to assure the competence and moral character of its members. See Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 723 F.2d 98 at 103, 104. In the Piper case on page 102 we find the following language, which is here quoted without citation: The relationship between control over State bar membership and the State's ability to function as a sovereign political body is very

close. The bar is a vital component of the State Judiciary which, together with the Executive and Legislative branches, constitutes an essential ingredient of State government. Although not State employees, lawyers have long been considered officers of the Court. This designation does not refer to the fact that lawyers are officials capable of exercising judicial powers, but rather to the fact that lawyers are closely associated with, and have very important responsibilities to, a State Court. In our adversary system, competent and dedicated lawyers are essential in order for a State's judicial system - undoubtedly one of the essential attributes of state sovereignty - to function properly. Thus, the Supreme Court has said that a state's interest in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice. Accordi

ly, state bar regulations have usually been granted substantial deference by the Federal Courts. To the same effect is the decision in Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, (1982).

There is little question that even without specific language in the State Constitution, its highest Court of record possesses inherent powers to discipline the members of its bar and indeed by implication, at least, the Rhode Island Legislature, in Chapter 27, Section 11-2718 has indicated that the Supreme Court possesses the power to regulate and discipline members of the bar for breach of their duties.

Careful review by this Court of the Order issued on November 5 by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island makes clear that the hearing which it purports to hold will provide this Plaintirf with full, Federal Con-

stitutional rights to due process and e-
qual protection. She has the right to b
represented by counsel of her choice, to
cross-examine witnesses, and to compel t
attendance of witnesses in her favor.
Special Counsel has been appointed to re-
place Mr. Carter, and the Plaintiff has
been given the right to enter subpoenaes
even though it may not have been within
the timing she chose.

In sum, the Federal Constitutional cha
ges advanced in this case by Plaintiff I
find and rule to be without legal merit.
Her complaint that she could not depose
witnesses without the restrictions impos
under the applicable subsection of Rule
or that she might not have the right to
conduct oral discovery is devoid of Fede
al Constitutional merit. See Miner v. A
lass, 63 U.S. 641 (1960).

Nor is there merit to the requirement
she abide by the rule of confidentiality

nor that she claims deprivation of right to trial by jury for clearly disciplinary bar proceedings are not within the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial. And the claim that a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court may not likely be granted is not one of Constitutional dimension.

Given the strong legal preference that Federal Courts abstain from interference in proceedings of this type, and given the decision in cases such as Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975), which puts in the hands of those who, like the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, must here function both as investigatory and judicatory officers, it is clear that there is no violation of the Constitutional rights of this Plaintiff.

Accordingly, I find and rule that it is unlikely that this Plaintiff will succeed on the merits of this litigation and I further find and rule that the public in-

terest in the prompt and efficacious disposition of complaints against lawyers will be adversely affected if she is granted injunctive relief from the proceedings now pending in the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. The request for relief by way of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order accordingly must be and it is herewith denied. And the objection of the Plaintiff to these findings and rulings is herewith noted.

MRS. MUKA: Your Honor, I'd like to make a Rule 62(c) motion for injunction pending appeal.

THE COURT: And that motion is denied.

(Hearing concluded 4:13 p.m.)

****

15.1(j)(iii) Judgment Appealed From

(same as 15.1(j)(i))

15.1(j)(iv) Notice of Appeal

(filed July 15, 1985)

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS

SUPREME COURT

85-188 M.P.

No. DB-247

No. DB-248

FRANK A. CARTER, JR.
CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL
v.
BETTY O. MUKA

NOTICE OF APPEAL

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned respondent, BETTY O. MUKA, hereby appeals from the order of this court dated April 19, 1985 in the above entitled matters, to the United States Supreme Court, pursuant to the authority of Section 2101(c) of Title 28 of the United States Code, as of statutory right.

Dated: July 12, 1985

(signature of Betty O. Muka)

113 Kay St.

Ithaca, N. Y. 14850

(607) 257-2016

and

23 Carol Court

Providence, R. I. 02909

(401) 831-2282

Original to:

Clerk of the Rhode Island Supreme Court

250 Benefit St.

Providence, R. I. 02903

Copy to:

Kathleen Managhan, Esq.

Assistant Disciplinary Counsel

Corcoran, Peckham & Hayes, P.C.

P. O. Box 389

Newport, R. I. 02840

Copy to:

Frank A. Carter, Jr.

Disciplinary Counsel

250 Benefit St.

Providence, R. I. 02903

15.1(j)(v) Provisions of Law

(cited at 15.1(f))

Rhode Island Constitution, Article X

OF THE JUDICIAL POWER

Sec. 1 POWER VESTED IN COURTS. - The judicial power of this state shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the general assembly may, from time to time, ordain and establish.

...

****

Rhode Island Constitution, Articles of Amendment, Article XII

POWERS OF SUPREME COURT

Sec. 1. JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT. - The supreme court shall have final revisory and appellate jurisdiction upon all questions of law and equity. It shall have power to issue prerogative writs, and shall also have such other jurisdiction as may, from time to time, be prescribed by

law. A majority of its judges shall always be necessary to constitute a quorum. The inferior courts shall have such jurisdiction as may, from time to time, be prescribed by law.

...

****

Rhode Island Supreme Court Rule 42 et seq.

42. Complaints against attorneys.

42-1. Jurisdiction. - Any attorney admitted to practice law in this state, or any attorney specially admitted by a court of this state for a particular proceeding, is subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of this court.

...

42-2 Grounds for discipline. - Acts or omissions by an attorney, individually or in concert with any other person or persons, which violate the code of professional responsibility as adopted and promulgated as a rule of this court, and failure

to comply with reasonable orders or requests of Disciplinary Counsel or the Disciplinary Board shall constitute misconduct and shall be grounds for discipline, whether or not the act or omission occurred in the course of an attorney-client relationship.

42-3. Types of discipline. - Misconduct shall be grounds for:

(a) disbarment by this court: or

(b) suspension by this court for a period not exceeding five (5) years;

(c) public or private censure or admonition by this court.

42-4. Disciplinary board of this court. - (a) This court shall appoint a board to be known as "The Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island" (hereinafter referred to as "the Board") which shall consist of nine (9) members of the bar of this state, one (1) of whom shall be designated by this court as Chairman

and another as Vice Chairman.

...

(c) The Board shall have the power and duty:

(1) to consider and cause to be investigated the conduct of any attorney on its own motion or upon complaint in writing by any person or as directed by this court;

(2) to review the findings and recommendations of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, hereinafter referred to, with respect to formal charges and to prepare and forward its own findings and recommendations to this court, which shall review such findings and recommendations on the basis of the record and shall enter an appropriate order disposing of the proceeding:

...

(4) to adopt rules of procedure not inconsistent with these rules and ...

...

42-5 Disciplinary counsel. - (a) This

court shall sppoint a Chief Disciplinary Counsel (hereinafter referred to as "Counsel") and such assistants and staff as may from time to time be required to properly perform the functions hereinafter prescribed.

(b) Counsel shall have the power and duty: (1) to investigate all matters involving alleged misconduct which come to his attention whether by complaint or otherwise; (2) to recommend to the Board the disposition of all matters involving alleged misconcuct by dismissal or the prosecution of formal charges. Except in matters requiring dismissal because the complaint is frivolous on its face or falls outside the Board's jurisdiction, no disposition shall be recommended by Counsel until the respondent-attorney shall have been afforded an opportunity to state his position with respect to the allegations against him.

(3) to prosecute all disciplinary proce
ings before the Board:

...

(6) to maintain permanent records of al
matters processed and the disposition
thereof.

42-6 Procedure. - (a) Investigation - A
investigations, whether upon complaint
otherwise, shall be initiated and condu
by Counsel. Upon the conclusion of an
vestigation, Counsel shall recommend to
the Board the disposition of all matter
involving alleged misconduct either by
dismissal or by the prosecution of form
charges before the Board. The recommen
disposition shall be reviewed by the Bo
which may approve or modify such recomm
dation. A respondent-attorney may dema
as of right that a formal proceeding be
instituted against him before the Board
In the event of such demand, the matter
shall be disposed of in the same manner

any other formal hearing instituted before the Board.

(b) Formal Hearing - Formal disciplinary proceedings before the Board shall be instituted by Counsel filing with the Board a petition setting forth with specificity the charges of misconduct. A copy of the petition shall be served upon the respondent-attorney. Within twenty (20) days thereafter, the respondent-attorney shall serve a copy of his answer upon Counsel and file the original thereof with the Board. In the event the respondent-attorney fails to file an answer, the charges shall be deemed at issue. Following the service of the answer, if there are any issues of fact raised by the pleadings or if the reqpondent-attorney requests the opportunity to be heard in mitigation, the matter shall be assigned to the Board, and Counsel shall serve a notice of hearing upon the respondent-attorney, or his

counsel, indicating the date and place o
the hearing, at least fifteen (15) days
in advance thereof. The notice of heari
shall advise the respondent-attorney tha
he is entitled to be represented by coun
sel, to summon and cross-examine witness
and to present evidence in his own behal

In the event a division of the Board
conducts a formal hearing, it shall re-
ceive evidence, make findings of fact an
recommendations to the Board for Board
action.

The Board shall submit a report to
this Court within sixty (60) days after
the conclusion of the hearing and submis
sion of briefs, if any, containing its
findings and recommendations, together
with a record of the proceedings before

If after notice of hearing has been
served any member of the Board assigned
hear the matter is unable to serve and n
other member of the Board is available,

former member of the Board, designated by the Chairman or Vice Chairman, is authorized and may sit in his stead.

(c) Annual Report - The Board shall annually in July report to this Court in writing all matters presented for its consideration during the year ended on the previous April 30.

(d) Review by this Court - If the Board determines that a proceedings should be dismissed, or that it should be concluded by private censure, it shall instruct Counsel to notify this Court of its recommendation, and this Court shall enter an appropriate order. If the Board shall determine that the matter should be concluded by a recommendation of public censure, suspension or disbarment, it shall submit its findings and recommendations, together with the entire record, to this Court, This Court shall review the record and enter an appropriate order.

Proceedings, if any, before this Court shall be conducted by Counsel.

(e) Duty to Cooperate - The failure of an attorney whose conduct is the subject of an investigation authorized by these rules to comply with the reasonable orders and requests of either Counsel or the Board shall constitute unprofessional conduct, and any such failure shall be referred forthwith to this Court for such action as it deems appropriate.

42-7. Immunity. - Members of the Board, Counsel and staff shall be immune from suit for any conduct in the course of their official duties.

Complaints against members of the Board involving alleged violations of the code of professional responsibility shall be submitted directly to this court. Complaints against Counsel involving alleged violations of the code of professional responsibility shall be submitted directly to the Board.

...

42-11 Subpoena powers. - At any state of an investigation, Counsel shall have the right to summon witnesses and require production of records by issuance of sub-

poenas. A respondent-attorney shall have the right to summon witnesses and require production of records before the Board by issuance of subpoenas.

Said subpoenas shall be obtained by filing with the Clerk of this court a statement calling for the issuance of the subpoena. On the same day that this statement is filed with the Clerk, the party seeking the subpoena shall send by registered or certified mail a copy of said statement to either Counsel or the respondent-attorney, as the case may be. Upon the filing of the statement, the Clerk shall forthwith issue the subpoena, and it shall be served by a duly authorized officer.

Said subpoenas shall clearly indicate on their face that the subpoenas are issued in connection with a confidential investigation under these rules, and that it is regarded as contempt of this court or

grounds for discipline under these rules for a person subpoenaed to breach the confidentiality of the investigation. It shall not be regarded as a breach of confidentiality for a person subpoenaed to consult with an attorney.

All participants in the proceeding shall conduct themselves so as to maintain the cinfidentiality of the proceeding.

Any attack on the validity of a subpoena so issued shall be heard and determined by the Board.

Witnesses before the Board shall be examined under oath or affirmation.

Testimony may be taken by deposition or such other method as may be authorized by the Board if the witness is not subject to service of subpoena or is unable to attend or testify at the hearing because of age, illness or other infirmity. A complete record of the testimony so taken shall be made and preserved.

The subpoena and deposition procedure shall be subject to the protective requirements of confidentiality provided in Rule 42-21.

Any rule or rules of this court or any statute or statutes providing for discovery are not applicable in this type of proceeding, which proceeding shall be governed by these rules alone.

...

42-21 Confidentiality. - All proceedings involving allegations of misconduct by or incapacity of an attorney shall be kept confidential until and unless this court enters an order imposing some disciplinary sanction, except where the proceeding is predicated upon a conviction of the respondent-attorney for a crime. This provision shall not be construed to deny access to relevant information to authorized agencies investigating the qualifications of judicial candidated, for admission to practice

or for government employment; provided, however, the fact of any dismissed complaint shall be deemed irrelevant to any such investigation. The Clerk of court shall transmit notice of all discipline imposed by this court, or transfers to inactive status due to incapacity, to the National Discipline Data Bank maintained by the American Bar Association.

****

Rhode Island General Laws 8-6-2

Rules of practice and procedure. - The supreme court, the superior court, the family court and the district court, by a majority of their members, shall have the power to make rules for regulating practice, procedure and business therein. The rules of the superior, family and district court shall be subject to the approval of the supreme court. Such rules, when effective, shall supersede any statutory regulation in conflict therewith.

In prescribing such rules the said court shall have regard to the simplification of the system of pleading, practice and procedure in the courts in which such rules shall apply, on order to promote the speedy determination of litigation on the merits; provided, however, that each respective court shall not in said rules of procedure require a party to a civil action to produce either by discovery, motion to produce or interrogatory an income tax return, W-2 statement, or copies thereof. The rules presently in effect in the courts of the judicial system shall remain and continue in force and effect until revised, amended, repealed, or superseded by rules adopted in accordance with this section.

****

United States Constitution Art. VI

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

... This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof: and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.

The senators and representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several state legislatures, and all executives and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to support this Constitution ...

****

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1 - Citizenship- Privileges and Immunities - Due process - Equal protection of laws. - All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and

subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

****

United States Constitution, Amendment I - Religious and political freedom. - Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

****

Rhode Island Code of Professional Responsibility, selected Disciplinary Rules: DR 1-103(A) and (B) Disclosure of Information to Authorities. - (A) A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of DR 1-102 shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violation. (B) A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge or evidence concerning another lawyer or a judge shall reveal fully such knowledge or evidence upon proper request of a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon the conduct of lawyers or judges.

****

DR 7-102(A)(1), (2) and (6) Representing a Client Within the Bounds of the Law. (A)I his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: (1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of

his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another (2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. ...(6) Participate in the creation or preservation of evidence when he knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false.

****

DR 7-106(C) Trial Conduct. - ... (C) In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not: (1) State or allude to any matter that he has no reasonable basis to believe is relevant to the case or that will not be supported by admissible evidence. (2) Ask any question that he has no reasonable basis to believe is relevant to the case and that is

intended to degrade a witness or other person. (3) Assert his personal knowledge of the facts in issue, except when testifying as a witness. (4) Assert his personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the credibility of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant, or as to the guilt of innocence of an accused; but he may argue, on his analysis of the evidence, for any position or conclusion with respect to the matters stated herein. (5) Fail to comply with known local customs of courtesy or practice of the bar or a particular tribunal without giving to opposing counsel timely notice of his intent not to comply. (6) Engage in undignified or discourteous conduct which is degrading to a tribunal. (7) Intentionally or habitually violate any established rule of procedure or of evidence.

****

DR 8-102(B) - Statements Concerning Judges

and Other Adjudicatory Officers. - (B) A lawyer shall not knowingly make false accusations against a judge or other adjudicatory officer.

****

DR 6-101(A)(3) Failing to Act Competently - (A) A lawyer shall not: ... (3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.

****

Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure Section 1(b) - 1. Scope of rules. - ... (b) Rules Not to Affect Jurisdiction. These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of any court as established by law.

****

Rhode Island General Laws 8-2-16 Motions for new trial - Extraordinary writs. - The superior court shall have jurisdiction of such motions for new trials as may be provided by law, ...

Rhode Island Constitution, Article I
(selected sections)

Sec. 2 - Laws for good of whole - ... All free governments are instituted for the protection, safety and happiness of the people. All laws, therefore, should be made for the good of the whole; ...

****

Sec. 5 - Remedies for wrongs - Right to justice. - Every person within this state ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character. He ought to obtain right and justice freely and without purchase, completely and without denial; promptly and without delay; conformably to the laws.

****

Sec. 6 Rights of accused in criminal proceedings. - In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a

speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury; to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining them in his favor, to have the assistance of counsel in his defense, and shall be at liberty to speak for himself; nor shall he be deprived of life, liberty, or property, unless by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.

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Sec. 13. Self-incrimination. - No man in a court of common law shall be compelled to give evidence criminating himself.

**********'

Sec. 14. Presumption of innocence - Securing of accused. - Every man being presumed innocent, until he is pronounced guilty by the law, no act of severity which is not necessary to secure an accused person shall be permitted.

Sec. 15. Trial by jury. - The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.

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Rhode Island Rules of Criminal Procedure

Sec. 23(a) - Trial by jury or by the court. - (a) Trial by Jury. Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant in open court waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court.

****

Rhode Island Rules of Civil Practice (selected portions of rules)

R.C.P. 5(e) - Service and filing of pleadings and other papers. - ... (e)Filing with the Court Defined. The filing of pleadings and other papers with the court as required by these rules shall be made by filing them with the clerk of the court, ...

****

R.C.P. 26(a). - Depositions pending action. - (a) When Depositions May Be Taken. Any

party may take the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories for the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for both purposes. After commencement of the action the deposition may be taken without leave of court ... The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of subpoena as provided in Rule 45.

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R.C.P. 27(a) - Depositions before action or pending appeal. - (a) Before Action. The perpetuation of testimony regarding any matter which may be cognizable in this court shall be in accordance with the statutes of this state. ...

****

RCP. 28(a) Persons before whom depositions may be taken. - (a) Within the State. Within the state depositions shall be taken before an officer authorized to admini-

ister oaths by the law of the state or before a person appointed by the court. A person so appointee has the power to administer oaths and take testimony.

****

R.C.P. 30(a) Depositions upon oral examination. - (a) Notice of Examination: Time and Place. A party desiring to take the depositon of any person upon oral examination shall give reasonable notice in writing to every other party to the action not in default. ...

****

R.C.P. 31. Depositions of witnesses upon written interrogatories. - (a) ... Notice. A party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon written interrogatories shall serve them upon every other party not in default with a notice stating the name and address of the person who is to answer them and the name or descriptive title and address of the officer before

whom the deposition is to be taken. ...

****

RCP 33 Interrogatories to parties. - (a) Availability: Answers: Objections. Any party may serve upon any adverse party written interrogatories to be answered by the party served, ... Interrogatories may be served after commencement of the action and without leave of court ... The interrogatories shall be answered separately and fully in writing under oath. The answers shall be signed by the person making them; and the party upon whom the interrogatories have been served shall serve a copy of the answers on the party submitting the interrogatories within forty (40) days after the service of the interrogatories....

****

RCP 34 Production of documents and things and entry upon land for inspection for other purposes. - (a) Scope. Subject

to provisions of Rule 30(b), any party may serve on any other party a request (1) to produce and permit the party making the request, or someone acting on his behalf, to inspect and copy, any designated documents (including writings, ... and any other data compilations from which intelligence can be perceived, ...) or to inspect and copy, test, ... any tangible thing which constitutes or contains matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) and which are in the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is served; or (2) to permit entry upon designated land or other property in the possession or control of the party upon whom the request is served for the purpose of inspection .... the property or any designated object or operation thereon, within the scope of Rule 26(b). (b) Procedure. The request may, without leave of court, be served upon the plaintiff

after commencement of the action and upon any other party with or after service of the summons and complaint upon that party. ... The party upon whom the request is served shall be obligated to comply therewith unless ...

****

R.C.P. 36 Admission of facts and of genuineness of documents. - (a) Request for Admission. After commencement of an action a party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuine ness of any relevant matters of fact set forth in the request. ... Each of the mattersof which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless ...

****

R.C.P. 37. Refusal to make discovery - Consequences. - (a) Refusal to Answer. If a party or other deponent refuses to answer any question propounded upon oral

examination, the ... (person asking it) may apply to the court for an order compelling an answer. Upon the failure of a deponent or party to answer any interrogatories submitted under Rule 31 or Rule 33, ... or upon the failure of a party to make discovery as requested under Rule 34, the proponent of the question or the requesting party may make like application for such an order. If the motion is granted the court shall ...require the party or deponent .. or attorney advising such conduct ... to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney's fees, ... (b) Failure to Comply With Order. - (1) Contempt. If a party or other witness refuses to be sworn or refuses to answer any question after being directed to do so by the court, the refusal may be considered a contempt of court. (2) Other Consequences. .... (i) ... facts shall be

taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order. (ii) an order refusing to allow the disobedient paety to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing in evidence designated documents or things or items of testimony... (iii) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceedings or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party.... (iv) order directing arres of any party ... (c)Expenses on Refusal to Admit. ... under Rule 36 ... order requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in making such proof, including reasonable attorney's fees....

****

R.C.P. 38 Jury trial of right. - (a)

Right Preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by Article I., Section 15 of the constitution of this state or as given by a statute shall be preserved to the parties inviolate. (b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury by serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing at any time after the commencement of the action and not later than ten (10) days after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue. Such demand may be indorsed upon a pleading of the party.

****

R.C.P. 39. Trial by jury or by the court. - (a) By Jury. When trial by jury has been demanded as provided in Rule 38, the action shall be designated upon the docket as a jury action. The trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless (1) the parties or their attorneys of record, by written stipulation filed with the

court or by an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in the record, consent to trial by the court sitting without a jury or (2) the court upon motion or of its own initiative finds that a right of trial by jury of some or all of those issues does not exist und r the constitution or statutes of this state. ...

****

R.C.P. 45. - Subpoena. - (a) For Attendance of Witnesses: Form: Issuance. Every subpoena shall be issued by the clerk of court or a notary public or other officer authorized by statute, ... shall command each person to whom it is directed to attend and give testimony at a time and place therein specified. (b) For Production of Documentary Evidence. A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents, or tangible things designated therein; but the court, upon motion made promptly

and in any event at or before the time specified in the subpoena for compliance therewith, may (1) quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable and oppressive or (2) condition denial of the motion upon the advancement by the person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued of the reasonable cost of producing the books, papers, documents, or tangible things. (c) Service. A subpoena may be served by the sheriff, by his deputy, by a constable, or by any other person who is not a party and is not less than eighteen (18) years of age. ... (e) Subpoena for a Hearing or Trial. Subpoenas for attendance at a hearing or trial shall be issued at the request of any party. (f) Contempt. Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon him may be deemed a contempt of the court in which the action is pending.

****

R.C.P. 59. New trials - Amendment of judgments. - (a) Grounds. A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues (1) in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of this state; and (2) in an action tried without a jury, for any of the reasons for which rehearings have heretofore been granted in suits in equity in the courts of this state. ... (b) Time for Motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than ten (10) days after the entry of the judgment. A copy of the motion for a new trial shall be filed with the trial justice contemporaneously with its filing with the clerk of the court. (c) Time for Serving Affidavits. When a motion for new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the

motion. The opposing party has ten (10) days after such service within which to serve opposing affidavits, which period may be extended for an additional period not exceeding twenty (20) days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. (d) On Initiative of Court. Not later than ten (10) days after entry of judgment the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds therfor. ...

****

United States Constitution, Amendment 5
Presentment or indictiment - double jeopardy - Self-incrimination - Due process - Compensation for private property. - No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, un-

less on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except ...; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use...

****

United States Constitution, Amendment 6
Rights of accused in criminal prosecutions. - In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses

in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

****

Title 28 U.S.C. 1981 - Equal rights under the law. All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of of every kind, and to no other.

Supreme Court, U.S.
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CLERK

No. 85-1537

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

BETTY O. MUKA,
APPELLANT,

v.

FRANK A. CARTER, JR.,
CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL,
APPELLEE.

MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL FROM THE RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT

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I

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Should Appellant's constitutional challenges to the Disciplinary Rules of the Rhode Island Supreme Court be heard initially in the U.S. District Court?

2. Does the Court have jurisdiction to review the Questions Presented by Appellant which do not raise federal issues?

3. Does this Court have jurisdiction to review the opinion of the Rhode Island Supreme Court which opinion contains no decision on federal issues?

4. Were there sufficient non-federal grounds to support the Supreme Court's Opinion?

5. Ought Appellant to be allowed to assert a right to review by certiorari?

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FRANK A. CARTER, JR.,
CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL,
APPELLEE.

MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL FROM THE RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT

Opinion Below

The Opinion of the Rhode Island Supreme Court in the instant case is cited at 502 A.2d 327 and is set forth in Appellant's Appendix at pages A-1 through A-6k.

Statutory Provisions Involved

28 U.S.C. Section 1257. State courts; appeal; certiorari: Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:

(1) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States and the decision is against its validity.

(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.

(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a State statute is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.

For the purposes of this section, the term "highest court of a State" includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Also relevant are Rhode Island Supreme Court Disciplinary Rule 42-4 cited at Appellant's Appendix A-33; Rhode Island Disciplinary Rule 42-5, cited at Appellant's Appendix A-34; Rhode Island Disciplinary Rule 42-6, cited at Appellant's Appendix A-36, Disciplinary Rule 7-102 cited at Appellant's Appendix A-6j through A-6k, Disciplinary Rule 7-106, cited at Appellant's Appendix A-6k, and Disciplinary Rule 8-102, cited at Appellant's Appendix A-51 through A-52.

Statement of Case

This appeal comes before this Court as a request to review an Opinion of the Rhode Island Supreme Court, which Opinion directed the disbarment of Appellant Betty O. Muka from the practice of law in the State of Rhode Island. Appellee

Frank A. Carter, Jr., Chief Disciplinary Counsel, hereby moves that said appeal be dismissed on the grounds that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the same pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 1257.

Appellee Frank A. Carter, Jr. is Chief Disciplinary Counsel for the Supreme Court of the State of Rhode Island with the responsibility for investigating, and if necessary, prosecuting alleged infractions by members of the Bar of the State of Rhode Island of Disciplinary Rules of the Rhode Island Supreme Court governing attorneys practicing in the State of Rhode Island. (See Rule 42-5, Supreme Court Disciplinary Rules at Appellant's Appendix A-34.) On or about June 4, 1984, Appellee filed two Petitions for Disciplinary Action in the Clerk's Office of the Rhode Island Supreme Court, alleging a number of violations by Appellant of said Disciplinary Rules. Such violations included accusing a respected member of the Rhode Island Supreme Court judiciary of accepting a bribe to dispose of a case and of being a member of organized crime. Ordinarily, the filing of such a Petition would be followed by a hearing before one of three Disciplinary Boards. (See Rule 42-4, Supreme Court Disciplinary Rules at Appellant's Appendix A-33, and Rule 42-6, Supreme Court Disciplinary Rules at Appellant's Appendix A-36.) The Rhode Island Supreme Court would then review the findings and recommendations of the Disciplinary Board. However, prior to June 4, 1984, Appellant had already filed her own Disciplinary Petitions against all nine Board members, who thereupon recused themselves from hearing Appellee's Petitions. Therefore, the Rhode Island Supreme Court was the only remaining disciplinary forum available before which testimony in support of Appellee's Petitions could be presented. Following the filing of said Petitions, and Appellant's responses thereto, hearings therefore took place before the Rhode Island Supreme Court, which included the taking of testimony from numerous witnesses over a period of six months from November, 1984 through April, 1985.

Those hearings resulted in the entry of a temporary Order by the Rhode Island Supreme Court dated April, 19, 1985, suspending Appellant from the practice of law in the State of Rhode Island. A final Opinion directing disbarment was entered on December 5, 1985. (See Appellant's Appendix A-1 through A-6k.)

Shortly before the disciplinary proceedings against Appellant were to begin in the Rhode Island Supreme Court, she filed a 53 page verified Complaint in the Federal District Court for the District of Rhode Island, alleging numerous state and federal constitutional infirmities in the Disciplinary Rules themselves and with regard to their application to her. The cause was initially filed in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, but was transfered by that Court to the District of New Hampshire, due to the fact that Appellant Muka had named as party Defendants, all of the justices of the Rhode Island Supreme Court as well as most of the judges on the Rhode Island Superior Court (Rhode Island's chief trial court), all jurists who had allegedly denied Appellant her constitutional rights at some time in the past. (See heading of Appellant's Complaint at A-1).

Among the prayers for relief contained in that Complaint was a prayer for an injunction against the commencement of the pending disciplinary proceedings. Pursuant to that prayer, an evidentiary hearing was held before the Honorable Shane Devine, U.S. District Judge for the District of New Hampshire, the day before the disciplinary proceedings were to begin. Appellant's request for an injunction was denied in a holding which determined that Appellant's constitutional due process rights were being adequately protected by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Appellant Muka appealed Judge Devine's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which on April 24, 1985, affirmed Judge Devine's order (see decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit *in re: Betty O. Muka* v. *The Supreme Court*

of the State of Rhode Island, et al. at A-2 - A-4). Appellant has not sought further review of this decision. The federal cause has now been remanded back to the District Court in New Hampshire for further disposition of Appellant Muka's remaining claims.

Reasons For Granting Motion To Dismiss

I. Appellant's Constitutional Challenges to the Disciplinary Rules of the Rhode Island Supreme Court Should be Heard and Ruled on Initially in the Pending Federal District Court Proceeding.

A number of Appellant's Questions Presented (specifically 11, 16, 17, 19, 22, 24, 25, 26, 28,) assert federal constitutional challenges to the Rhode Island Supreme Court Disciplinary Rules themselves without specific reference to their application to Appellant in the proceedings which took place in the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Those same constitutional challenges to the Disciplinary Rules are repeated in Appellant's pending District Court action in Claim No. 2.

This court in *District of Columbia Court of Appeals* v. *Feldman*, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1316-1317, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983), expressly stated that Federal District Courts have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain challenges to state bar rules. The U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire will, as part of its disposition of Appellant's Complaint, be ruling on the same constitutional challenges that Appellant has made in the enumerated questions to certain of the Rhode Island Supreme Court Disciplinary Rules. Since the Rhode Island Supreme Court did not itself address the constitutionality of its Disciplinary Rules in its Opinion—giving this Court no constitutional determination to review—Appellant ought not to be allowed to compel this Court to be the Court of first instance in making these constitutional determinations.

In addition, the only constitutional issues raised by Appellant before the Rhode Island Supreme Court—either concerning the Disciplinary Rules themselves, or concerning their application to her—were those raised in Questions Presented numbers 17 and 28 (immunity as a violation of the 14th Amendment, and infringement of her First Amendment rights of freedom of speech). This Court ought additionally therefore to decline to accept for review any of the constitutional issues raised by Appellant save these two. *Cardinale* v. *Louisiana*, 394 U.S. 437, 89 S.Ct. 1161, 22 L.Ed.3d 398 (1969).

II. This Court Lacks the Jurisdiction to Review by Appeal Questions Presented by Appellant Which do not Raise Federal Issues.

28 U.S.C. Section 1257 provides for appellate review by this Court of final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a state:

1. By appeal where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States and the decision is against its validity.

2. By appeal where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States and the decision is in favor of its validity.

Most of the Questions Presented by Appellant raise no federal statutory or federal Constitutional issue, but call only for the construction or the statutory of Constitutional law of the State of Rhode Island. Specifically those Questions Presented which raise no federal issue are: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12 (general reference to "constitutionality", but not specific reference as to which constitution, e.g. federal or state, and appropriate section), 13, 14, 15, 20, 29, 30 and 34 (again a general reference to unconstitutional application of a Disciplinary Rule without reference to which constitution), 31,—additional reference to unconstitutional treatment without further speci-

ficity, 32—further vague reference to unconstitutionality, 33, 35—further vague reference to unconstitutionality, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 44—further vague reference to unconstitutionality, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53 and 54.

As to those Questions Presented which refer vaguely to some form of unconstitutionality, neither Appellee nor this court should be compelled to guess to which section of which constitution, federal or state, Appellant wishes to refer: As to question 55, it is not likely that this Court would be willing to take responsibility for determining on Plaintiff's behalf, whether any other of her federal rights have been violated. None of the enumerated Questions Presented draw into question the kind of federal issue referred to in the quoted sections of 28 U.S.C. Section 1257. Therefore, as to these recited Questions Presented this appeal ought to be dismissed.

III. The Rhode Island Supreme Court Made no Decision in Favor of the Validity of a State Statute Which Would Give This Court Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).

28 U.S.C. Section 1257(2) provides for appeal to this court from an Opinion of the highest court of a state "where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States and the decision is in favor of its validity". As previously stated, of Appellant's Questions Presented, only a percentage raise federal constitutional challenges and of that percentage, only two—the issues raised in Questions Presented, numbers 17 and 28—were raised before the Rhode Island Supreme Court in the form of Appellant's Answer to the Disciplinary Counsel's complaints. Examination of the final Opinion of the Rhode Island Supreme Court will show that that Court dealt only with the facts presented to it at the numerous hearings it held, which supported Appellee's assertion that Appellant had violated certain specified

Disciplinary Rules of the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The Rhode Island Supreme Court did not consider either of the constitutional assertions raised by Appellant. Therefore, there is no "decision" for this court to review as required by 28 U.S.C. Section 1257(2). The lack of such an express decision denies to this Court jurisdiction to consider Appellant's appeal on these two Questions Presented. See *Crowell* v. *Randell*, 35 U.S. 369, 9 L.Ed. 458 (1836), *Franks* v. *Delaware*, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978).

IV. There Were Sufficient Non-Federal Grounds Present to Support Appellant's Disbarment.

Disciplinary proceedings were commenced against Appellant for her violation of a number of Rhode Island Supreme Court Disciplinary Rules, among them, Disciplinary Rule 7-102 (Appellant's Appendix A-6j through A-6k), Disciplinary Rule 7-106 (Appellant's Appendix A-6k) and Disciplinary Rule 8-102 (Appellant's Appendix A-51 through A-52).

The Rhode Island Supreme Court in its *per curiam* Opinion enumerated the following conduct of Appellant with regard to a medical malpractice case which she had prosecuted in the Rhode Island Superior Court:

1. In two documents filed in the Clerk's Office, Appellant made a variety of unsupported defamatory allegations against several judges, including the Trial Court Judge of the medical malpractice case in which the pleadings were filed; attorneys, court personnel, and other members of the public. The allegations included charges of conspiracy, obstruction of justice, suborning perjury, payoffs and membership in the judicial mafia. No evidence was presented to the Rhode Island Supreme Court to support these allegations, which were refuted by witnesses presented on behalf of Appellee.

2. In testimony before the Rhode Island Supreme Court, Appellee admitted altering an exhibit which was in the appeal file of the medical malpractice case.

3. Transcripts of the medical malpractice file included statements by Appellant characterized by the Rhode Island Supreme Court as "vituperative and unsupported accusations against Justice Needham [the Trial Court judge], members of the bar and other persons as set forth in our Order, either with actual knowledge of the falsity of said accusations or with reckless disregard of whether they were true or false", Opinion of Rhode Island Supreme Court, Appellant's Appendix A-6a through A-6b. Indeed, Appellant's statement of the case filed with this court repeats many of these same accusations.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court also summarized Appellant Muka's *pro se* activities within the State of New York in a number of reported cases in which she had engaged in much the same conduct. In fact, in one of those cases, *Muka* v. *New York State Bar Association*, 120 Misc.2d 897, 898, 466 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (1983), Appellant had listed as Defendants Cornell Law School, members of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, the New York State Court of Appeals, the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct and six Supreme Court justices in the Sixth Judicial District (Appellant's Appendix A-6d through A-6e). In another action, she named as Defendants a United States District Court Judge, Governor Hugh Carey of the State of New York, the State Attorney General, then United States Attorney General Griffin Bell, both houses of the New York State Legislature, the American Bar Association, the Chief Judge of the New York State Court of Appeals, the Dean of the Harvard Law School and a number of other judges (Appellant's Appendix A-6f through A-6g). Appellant has since been enjoined from commencing any civil action in New York, unless represented by a licensed attorney of that state. In summary, said the Rhode Island Supreme Court:

> Not only is her procedural knowledge patently inadequate, but she has manifested in this State and also in the State of New York, an utter disregard for the requirements of law and the rights of any person who has the temerity

> to disagree with her or refuses to grant whatever request or demand the respondent may make upon him or her. (Appellant's Appendix A-6h).

Appellant's habit of suing or castigating every member of the judicial community with which she comes in contact continued when she came to Rhode Island as can be seen from the Supreme Court's recitation of her activities and from Appendix A-1, the heading of the action which she has filed in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. Her activities, especially her accusations against the Superior Court trial judge constitute blatant violations of the recited Disciplinary Rules. Her claim that her right to freedom of speech was unconstitutionally limited is contradicted by cases supporting the constitutionality of disciplinary rules such as DR 8-102(B). See e.g. in separate opinions of Justices Stewart and Frankfurter in *In re Sawyer*, 360 U.S. 622, 79 S.Ct. 1376, 3 L.Ed.2d 1473 (1959), and *State* v. *Eisenberg*, 48 Wis.2d 364, 180 N.W.2d 529, *cert. den.* 402 U.S. 987, 91 S.Ct. 1669, 29 L.Ed.2d 153, *rehearing den.* 403 U.S. 940, 91 S.Ct. 2250, 29 L.Ed.2d 721. Her claim that she has been denied due process is contradicted by the extensive number of hearings held before the Rhode Island Supreme Court on the two disciplinary complaints brought against her, at which she was given every opportunity to contradict the contents of those complaints, but instead did her best to in fact reiterate before that court the unfounded accusations she had made below concerning various judges and lawyers in the State of Rhode Island. Indeed, the Rhode Island Supreme Court had no choice but to disbar her. See *Smith* v. *Smith*, 366 U.S. 210, 81 S.Ct. 1050, 6 L.Ed.2d 233 (1961).

V. APPELLANT OUGHT NOT TO BE ALLOWED TO ASSERT CERTIORARI AS A METHOD OF REVIEW.

Appellant clearly has sought review of the December 5, 1985 Opinion of the Rhode Island Supreme Court disbarring her from the practice of law by appeal rather than by certiorari. She argues on page 51 of her Jurisdictional Statement that her appeal is authorized by Section 1257(2) of Title 28 of the United States Code. Her Jurisdictional Statement is clearly entitled "Appeal from the Rhode Island Supreme Court". She also filed a "Notice of Appeal" with the Rhode Island Supreme Court appealing its order "as of statutory right" to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c). (See Appendix of Appellee Frank Carter, A-5).

On page 52 of her Jurisdictional Statement, Appellant claims that a Writ of Certiorari is also authorized to her by 28 U.S.C. Section 1257(3). Appellant has not filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. She has claimed a statutory right to an appeal. Assuming that this appeal is procedurally improper, this court ought to disregard Appellant's attempts to characterize her action as anything other than an appeal under Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1257(2).

Conclusion

For the aforesaid reasons, Appellee Frank A. Carter, Jr., Chief Disciplinary Counsel, respectfully requests that the Appeal of Betty O. Muka, from an Opinion of the Rhode Island Supreme Court dated December 5, 1985, be dismissed.

Respectfully submitted,

KATHLEEN MANAGHAN
CORCORAN, PECKHAM & HAYES
61 Long Wharf
Newport, Rhode Island 02840
(401) 847-0872
Counsel for Appellee

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

CIVIL ACTION NO. _____

BETTY O. MUKA,
PLAINTIFF,

v.

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, JOSEPH A. BEVILACQUA, THOMAS F. KELLEHER, JOSEPH R. WEISBERGER, FLORENCE KERINS MURRAY, DONALD F. SHEA, WALTER J. KANE, BRIAN B. BURNS, BEVERLY CLARK, RONALD A. TUTALO, THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, FRANK A. CARTER, JR., DISCIPLINARY BOARD, ERNEST AGRESTI, MELVIN A. CHERNICK, LEONARD KIERNAN, ROBERT KILMARX, LEWIS Z. LAVINE, JEREMIAH C. LYNCH, NANCY PALMISCIANO, ANTHONY VACCA, RONALD R. LAGUEUX, KENNETH P. BORDEN, ARTHUR G. CAPALDI, JOSEPH Q. CALISTA, JOSEPH F. RODGERS, COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND TENURE, RAYMOND J. SURDUT, KENNETH J. MACKSOUD, ROSENSTEIN SURDUT MACKSOUD & GOODWIN, B. LUCIUS ZARLENGA, EDWARD P. SOWA, GUNNING LAFAZIA & GNYS INC., JOHN B. REILLY, CLIFFORD J. CAWLEY, J. JOSEPH NUGENT, STEPHEN NUGENT, MARK T. NUGENT, THOMAS R. DESIMONE, JOHN T. BEVILACQUA, JOSEPH A. KELLY, DAVID W. CARROLL, MARK S. MANDELL, LOUIS B. RUBENSTEIN, ALFRED G. THIBODEAU, JOHN F. DOLAN, THOMAS H. NEEDHAM, NUGENT & NUGENT, LEONA CHARPENTIERE, JOHN DOE LAW CLERK OF THOMAS H. NEEDHAM, CHARLES F. TRUMPETTO, HENRY E. LALIBERTE, GORHAM & GORHAM, ALICE MILES, RUTH GORHAM, BRADFORD GORHAM, JOHN GORHAM, ARTHUR M. READ II, NICHOLAS BARRETT, ERNIE DIBELLO, ALEXANDER WALSH, MARY KING, SUPREME COURT CLERK'S OFFICE, SUPERIOR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE, ANTHONY A. GIANNINI, C. RUSSELL BENGSTON, CAROL A. CAMPAGNONE, ROSALIND CHASET, DOMINIC F. CRESTO, WILLIAM EGAN, HARRY M. IONNATTI, JOHN B. LAWLOR, LESLIE D. LEMIEUX, KATHLEEN MANAGHAN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE JOINT UNDERWRITERS ASSOCIATION OF RHODE ISLAND, and other John and Jane Does unknown at this time, PEERLESS INSURANCE COMPANY, ROSALIND CHASET AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE NATHAN D. CHASET, PIRRAGLIA, 6TH DISTRICT COURT CLERK'S OFFICE,
DEFENDANTS.

APPENDIX B

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 84-2036

BETTY O. MUKA,
PLAINTIFF, APPELLANT,

v.

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS, APPELLEES.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[HON. SHANE DEVINE, *US. District Judge*]

Before
CAMPBELL, *Chief Judge*,
BREYER AND TORRUELLA, *Circuit Judges*.

Betty O. Muka on brief pro se.
Marilyn F. McGair and *Thomas Dickinson*, Special Assistant Attorneys General, and *Arlene Violet*, Attorney General, on brief for appellees.

April 24, 1985

Per Curiam. Plaintiff, a lawyer facing disciplinary proceedings before the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, appeals from the denial of her motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the disciplinary proceedings on the grounds that the state constitution and various court rules are unconstitutional and that she has been denied due process in the proceedings.

Absent bad faith, harassment, or other extraordinary circumstances, federal courts must abstain from interfering with state disciplinary proceedings. *Middlesex County Ethics Committee* v. *Garden State Bar Association*, 457 U.S. 423 (1982). Pointing to her 53 page verified complaint and other pleadings, plaintiff contends she has shown the necessary bad faith. However, an evidentiary hearing was held on plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, after which the district court referred to abstention principles and found that the hearing the state court intended to hold would afford plaintiff due process and that it was unlikely plaintiff would succeed on the merits of her claims. Plaintiff has not furnished us with a transcript of the evidentiary hearing, and hence on the record before us we see no error or abuse of discretion in the denial of preliminary injunctive relief. *See Muniz Ramirez* v. *Puerto Rico Fire Services*, No. 84-1650, slip op. at 2-3 (1st Cir. April 1, 1985) (appellant's duty to furnish transcript).

Plaintiff's motion to strike the Attorney General's brief is denied. The Attorney General's motion for double costs is granted; attorneys fees are denied.

Affirmed.

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 84-2036

BETTY O. MUKA,
PLAINTIFF, APPELLANT,

v.

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS, APPELLEES.

JUDGMENT
ENTERED: APRIL 24, 1985

This cause came on appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire, and was submitted on the original record and the briefs.

Upon consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows: The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Double costs to appellees, Rhode Island Supreme Court, Et Al.

By the Court:

FRANK P. SCIGLIANO, *Clerk.*

APPENDIX C

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS

SUPREME COURT 85-188 M.P.
No. DB-247
No. DB-248

FRANK A. CARTER, JR.,
CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL

v.

BETTY O. MUKA

NOTICE OF APPEAL

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned respondent, BETTY O. MUKA, hereby appeals from the order of this court dated Dec. 5, 1985 in the above entitled matters, to the United States Supreme Court, pursuant to the authority of Section 2101(c) of Title 28 of the United States Code, as of statutory right.

(s) BETTY O. MUKA
BETTY O. MUKA, respondent
113 Kay St.
Ithaca, N.Y. 14850
(607) 257-2016
and
23 Carol Court
Providence, R.I. 02909
(401) 831-2282

Dated: March 4, 1986

Original to:
Clerk of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court
250 Benefit St.
Providence, R.I. 02903

Copy to:
Kathleen Managhan, Esq.
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel
Corcoran, Peckham & Hayes, P.C.
P.O. Box 389
Newport, R.I. 02840

Copy to:
Frank A. Carter, Jr.
Disciplinary Counsel
250 Benefit St.
PROVIDENCE, R.I. 02903

SUPREME COURT
RECEIVED
WALTER KANE, Clerk
1986 MAR. 5 AM 10:36